RACE, GENDER, AND TLE LAW IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY WORKPLACE: SOME
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

Susan Sturmt
We are at an important juncture in the development of race and gender
policy in this country. The prevailing regulatory framework erected in the
1960s and 1970s to address discrimination in the workplace faces
fundamental challenges. At a time when the United States population is
becoming increasingly diverse, traditional methods of considering race and
gender as "plus factors" or "add-ons" are being challenged in courts, 1
legislatures, 2 and public referenda3 with much greater frequency and
success. The widely shared moral consensus about the need to redress
racial and gender inequality has broken down.4 Those who are committed
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I. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that
racial classifications imposed by a government actor must be analyzed under strict scrutiny);
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a law school may not use
diversity as a basis for taking race into account in law school admissions), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1033 (1996); Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(holding that diversity may not be used by a school district as a basis for adopting an
affirmative action plan).
2. See, e.g., Donna St. George, For White Men, Anger Taking PoliticalShape, PHLA.
INQUIRER, Nov. 12, 1995, at Al (describing efforts in the Illinois, Georgia, and
Pennsylvania state legislatures to end race and gender protections).
3. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 31 (barring "preferential treatment" based on race or
gender).
4. See Tamar Lewin, Public Schools Confronting Issue of Racial Preferences, N.Y.
TImEs, Nov. 29, 1998, at Al (in public school districts, "an increasing number of parentsmostly white, are complaining about [affirmative action] policies they say are unfair to their
children."). In the words of Constance Homer, a member of the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission, "It's the end of an era. What tells us that this is the end of an era is that all
branches of government-the courts, the Congress, the White House, even the state
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to the civil rights vision of full participation in the arena of citizenship find
themselves on the defensive. The traditional civil rights paradigm that has
been in place for the past four decades no longer provides an adequate
the goals of racial and gender
vision or strategy for effectively pursuing
5
equality and fairness in the workplace.
This fundamental challenge to racial and gender policy coincides with
a period of transition in many workplaces and occupations. Employment
law has been developed largely to address a model of organization
premised on hierarchical, vertically integrated, stable, and centralized
bureaucracies. 6 This model has never fully reflected the dynamics of
power and decision making-even in traditionally organized bureaucracies.
Moreover, workplaces are in the midst of reorganizing production and
employment relationships in ways that explicitly depart from the
bureaucratic model of organizational governance. In these developing
structures, power and decision making patterns do not conform to the
traditional, top-down, hierarchical model pictured in much legal discourse
about the workplace.1 Organizational forms are emerging that eschew
stability, permanence, and rule-driven decision making in an effort to
respond to the demands for adaptability, flexibility, and technological
innovation. 8 Flexible governance requires workers at all levels to
participate more actively in decision making about work assignments,
leadership, advancement, pay, and evaluation. Workers from different
backgrounds and fields face the challenge of functioning effectively as
teams. 9 The boundaries between organizations and their customers, clients,
legislatures-are actively engaged in the same process, and that's a rare event in American
politics." St. George, supra note 2.
5. See LANi GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS SETBACK INTO A
NEW VISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 276-311 (1998).
6. See DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 125, 177-78 (1990);
Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLuM. L. REV.267 (1998).
7. See HARVEY, supra note 6, at 147; David Krackhardt & Jeffrey Hanson, Informal
Networks: The Company Behind the Chart, HARv. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1993, at 104.
8. See PETER DRUCKER, THE NEW REALirIES 207-31 (1989) (discussing changes in
work arrangements and management techniques necessitated by the growing importance of
information); HARVEY, supra note 6, at 156-58; MICHAEL PIORE & CHARLES SABEL, THE
SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE 282 (1984) ("[Mass-production corporations are flattening
their hierarchies and giving lower-level supervisors more authority, in order to speed
adjustment to shifting markets and to lower the cost of producing small lots."); Mark
Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation,94 CoLuM.
L. REV. 753, 879-903 (1994); Doff & Sabel, supra note 6; Paul Osterman, Impact of IT on
Jobs and Skills, in THE CORPORATION OF THE 1990S, at 220, 220-43 (discussing effects of
technological change on the nature of modem jobs and the structure of organizational
governance).
9. See Robert B. McKersie & Richard E. Walton, Organizational Change, in THE
CORPORATION OF THE 1990s 244, 249-50, 255-56 (Michael S. Morton ed., 1991) (discussing
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and suppliers are blurring. 10 Institutions and individuals operate in
environments that are increasingly mobile.' Many of the anchors against
insecurity and arbitrariness in the workplace, such as seniority, promotion
job descriptions, and union representation, have lost
ladders, established
12
their grip.

During this same time, the dynamics and patterns of racial and gender
exclusion or bias have also changed considerably. The classic forms of
deliberate exclusion based on race and gender that were characteristic of
the early stages of the civil rights regime certainly have not disappeared. 13
But patterns of exclusion, job segregation, and bias frequently emerge from
more subtle, interactive, and structural dynamics that often are not visible
within the individualistic, fault-driven categories embodied in current legal
structures. 14 The dynamics of conflict among diverse groups play a
significant role in shaping opportunity and exclusion, especially for
nondominant groups such as women and people of color.15 These

greater interdependence among workers necessitated by technological change).
10. See PETER CAPPELLI, CHANGE AT WORK (1997); Barenberg, supra note 8, at 883
(discussing the increasingly shifting boundaries within and among organizations); Peter
Cappelli, Rethinking Employment, 33 BRrr. J. INDUS. REL. 565 (1995); Charles Sabel,
Moebius-Strip Organizations and Open Labor Markets: Some Consequences of the
Reintegrationof Conception andExecution in a Volatile Economy, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A
CHANGING SOCIETY 23 (Pierre Bourdieu & James S. Coleman eds., 1991).
11. See ROSABETH Moss KANTER, WORLD CLASS 156 (1995) (describing the
uncertainty many workers experience concerning their jobs and the lack of protections
against layoff or discharge).
12. See HARvEY, supra note 6, at 150. Even the definitions and demands of expertise
are in flux. Learning problem solving, rather than mastering established bodies of
knowledge, increasingly constitutes the central challenge of many fields. Many professions,
including law, journalism, and law enforcement, are struggling to redefine their role and
mission.
13. The Texaco and Mitsubishi settlements are two recent indications that explicit bias
based on race and gender continues to account for the exclusion of women and people of
color from the workplace. See, e.g., Judge OKs Texaco's Settlement of Bias Suit, L.A.
TmIES, Mar. 27, 1997, at D3 (federal judge approved Texaco's $176 million settlement of
race discrimination suit); Mitsubishi Settles Sex Discrimination Case for $34 Million,
LIABILITY WK., June 15, 1998, at 24; Steven M. H. Wallman, Equality Is More Than
"OrdinaryBusiness", N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 30, 1997, § 3, at 13.
14. See Karen A. Jehn, Managing Workteam Diversity, Conflict, and Productivity: A
New Form of Organizing in the Twenty-First Century Workplace, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 473 (1998); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161,
1165 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rv. 317 (1987); Karen Proudford, Notes on the
Intra-GroupOrigins of Inter-Group Conflict in Organizations:Black-White Relations as an
Exemplar, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & ENIP. L. 615 (1998).
15. See Susan Jackson, Team Composition in Organizations,in GROUP PROCESS AND
PRODUCTIVITY (S. Worchel et al. eds., 1992); David Thomas & Karen L. Proudford, Making
Sense of Race Relations in Organizations:Theoriesfor Practice,in ADDRESSING CULTURAL

642

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 1:2

dynamics cannot be understood solely through an individualistic
framework of analysis. In addition, analysis based solely on motivation
ignores the role of cognition in shaping and producing bias.' 6 Recent
research in social psychology and organizational behavior offers insights
into the dynamics of racial and gender exclusion that cannot be processed
within the existing legal categories of analysis.
In addition, opportunity for advancement increasingly depends on
training, social networks, skills enhancement, and adaptability. 17 The
capacity to develop social and knowledge-based capital on the job requires
informal relationship building, making the patterns of interaction among
workers at comparable levels of the organization critical to opportunities
for advancement within the organization. 18 Subtle patterns of noninteraction or exclusion can deny access to these skills and relationships for
members of particular groups. These patterns emerge from structural
arrangements within the organization affecting who gets considered for
advancement, how decisions are made, how conflict is addressed generally,
and how problems or failures are processed by the organization. They
often signal more general gaps in the capacity of the19organization to
structure productive, fair, and dynamic work relationships.
These changes in the dynamics of discrimination and the structure of
workplace governance have not been accompanied by comparable changes
in the approach or content of legal regulation. 20 Legal doctrine reflects
ISSUES IN ORGANIZATIONS (Robert Carter ed., forthcoming 1999); Karen A. Jehn, et al.,
Opening Pandora's Box: A Field Study of Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in
Workgroups (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
16. See Krieger, supra note 14, at 1165.
17. See PETER DOEHRINGER ET AL., TURBULENCE IN THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE 4

(1992) (discussing the importance of on-the-job learning due to redeployment and layoffs);
KANTER, supra note 11, at 154-57 (new workplace security comes from employability,
which is a function of the chance to develop human capital); PIORE & SABEL, supra note 8,
at 273 (discussing the importance of broadly developed skills for workers).
18. See Bonalyn Nelsen, Should Social Skills Be in the Vocational Curriculum?
Evidence from the Automotive Repair Field, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRANSmONS
IN WORK AND LEARNING: IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSESSMENT 62, 63 (1997) ("Social capital

consists of the skills and knowledge required to evaluate and respond to situational demands
in social settings."); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretationsof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1749, 1823 (1990) (The experiences of women in the
workplace "and their exposure to opportunities seemed more crucial to the development of
their vocational interests than advance planning, preparation, or reinforcement from a
teacher, parent or counselor.").
19. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the
Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1025-26 (1996) (exploring the role of race and
gender patterns as signifiers of more general organizational dysfunction).
20. Other scholars have emphasized the structural nature of bias and the failure of
existing legal doctrine to account for the dynamics of discrimination, bias, and segregation.
See, e.g., Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional
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many outmoded assumptions about both the dynamics of discrimination
and the structure of decision making that were in place at the inception of
the civil rights regime.2 1 Individuals constitute the unit of analysis, to the
exclusion of groups and structures that often play more central roles in
causing individual exclusion based on race and gender.2 Traditionally
defined hierarchies between supervisors and subordinates shape analyses of
legal responsibility.
Fault-based discrimination reflecting intentional
exclusion based on class membership dominates analyses of bias and
exclusion.23
The gap between law and practice also exists at the level of how law is
understood and practiced within the sites that are the focus of legal
regulation.2 4 Legal discourse about workplace discrimination tends to
categorize regulatory options in terms of a series of dichotomies:
formal/informal, public/private, rule/discretion, and external/internal.
Legal doctrine, and lawyers' interpretation of that doctrine as advice to
their clients, tends to focus on two types of discriminatory conduct: the
rules and policies formulated at the top of organizations and the practices
of individuals in relation to those rules.2 5 Legal regulation is often framed
as a choice between two approaches: 1) a system of universal rules defined
externally by courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies, and imposed
on organizations through formal process; or 2) a system of private or
internal, informal processes that do not generate or inform norm
development and that essentially obviate the need for further external
regulation.2 6 Group-level interactions are often either disaggregated into a
series of individual actors or merged into analyses of organization-wide
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36-49 (1988); Tracy E. Higgins,
Limiting Respondeat Superior Liability: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?, 23 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1181 (1996); Hamilton Krieger, supra note 14; Schultz, supra note 18. However, their
remedial solutions remain within the doctrinal framework they intend to critique, and thus
fail to respond adequately to the critique of current regulatory approaches.
21. See infra Section Ill.
22. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953 (1993); Krieger, supra note
14.
23. Cf PHrLiPE NONET & PHILI SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY INTRANSITION: TOwARD
RESPONSIVE LAW (1978); JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE: A STUDY OF SELFREGULATION INOCCUPATIONAL SAFETY (1988) (observing the same dynamic in the context
of administrative regulation).
24. See Doff & Sabel, supra note 6.
25. Articles and books written by lawyers to aid in advising clients about employment
discrimination issues offer one source of information about how lawyers view
discrimination law. Informal interviews with lawyers about their role in counseling clients
offer another anecdotal source of information.
26. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The
Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 497 (1993). But
see NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 23; REES, supra note 23.

644

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 1:2

policies and practices. The process of intermediation between the legal
norm and complex internal dynamics of organizational
practice lies outside
27
the domain of traditional legal doctrine or practice.
The profound changes in the structure of governance and interaction
within the workplace necessitate rethinking the regulatory structure through
which issues of discrimination are addressed. This requires a move beyond
the traditional civil rights paradigm, which focused on articulating formal
rights enforced externally through after-the-fact, formal legal processes.28
These forms of legal intervention responded to pervasive, deliberate
exclusion and subjective bias practiced through informal, private,
unstructured decision making. They coincided with developments in
personnel practice that emphasized the importance of standardized,
objective measures of merit, designed to eliminate bias, reduce discretion,
and create mechanisms of accountability through articulation and
enforcement of uniform processes and standards. 29 Much of the current,
valid criticisms of alternative dispute resolution and negotiated rule making
document the dangers of informal, unaccountable processes that tend to
replicate existing power imbalances, using processes that appear fair and
are more difficult to challenge. 30 At the same time, proponents of
alternative dispute resolution and negotiated rule making challenge the
adequacy of formal, adversarial process as a means of reshaping
relationships, solving problems, and reallocating power.3 '
This article seeks to move beyond the debate between informal and
formal legal regulation. Both approaches reflect essential but limited
components of a legal regulatory regime. Neither approach adequately
responds to the simultaneous challenges of changing organizational
structure, racial and gender dynamics, and market-driven demands for
flexibility and adaptiveness. The next step requires that we take account of

27. The formal/informal dichotomy also frames the analysis of scholars who have
examined organizational responses to formal law. See, e.g., Edelman et al., supra note 26.
28. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and OrganizationalGovernance: The
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1401, 1402-09 (May
1990).
29. See James N. Baron et al., War and Peace: The Evolution of Modem Personnel
Administration in U.S. Industry, 92 AM. J. Soc. 350, 359-77 (Sept. 1986).
30. See Richard Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLTmCS
INFoRMAL

OF

JusnCE 267 (Richard Abel ed., 1982); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus:

The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997);
Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359; Edelman, supra note 28; Trina
Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545

(1990).
31. See generally Jody Freeman, CollaborativeGovernance in the AdministrativeState,
45 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1997); Cary Menkel Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System
in a PostModem Multicultural World, 38 WM. &MARY L. RnV. 5 (1996).

1998]

RACE, GENDER, AND THE LAW

the critiques of formality and informality. This requires embracing the
challenge of developing new forms of legal regulation that treat
organizational decision makers and incentive structures explicitly as part of
the legal regulatory regime. In this view, law consists of a set of practices,
incentives, structures, and principles that emerge both outside of and in
interaction with formal and instrumental law. This approach embraces the
process of experimenting with organizational structure, processes of
decision making about everyday work, and incentives as a part of an
explicit system of legal regulation. Workplaces operate within this legal
regime as functioning law-making bodies that operate in interaction with
other legal regulatory systems, rather than merely as objects of external or
private regulation. The challenge then becomes one of forging a dynamic
relationship between law as a system of enforcing minimum standards of
conduct through sanctions and law as a system for developing the capacity
and incentives to make those norms meaningful in the organizational
regimes that shape conduct on a day-to-day basis.
This article sketches out the major themes and directions suggested by
the need to rethink approaches to regulation of discrimination in the
workplace to respond to changes in organizational structure and
demographics. It is a first step in a larger theoretical project, currently
underway in collaboration with Chuck Sabel, of developing an approach to
law in the new workplace that has the potential to respond to the dynamic,
interactive, and unstable conditions in which employment practices
increasingly occur. In this article, the potential themes are introduced and
developed through examining three different organizational contexts,
presented in Section II, in which employment decision making illustrates
the racial, gender, and organizational dynamics that are emerging in the
workplace. Section E[I draws on these examples to question the continuing
validity of the assumptions about the structure of work and the dynamics of
bias that underlie current legal approaches to discrimination. Section IV
offers one example of an alternative regulatory process and structure
addressing racial and gender bias in the workplace to suggest the contours
of a more structural, dynamic, and integrated regulatory approach to the
problem of discrimination.
I.

THE DYNAMICs OF RACE, GENDER, AND LAW IN THE EMERGING
WORKPLACE: SOME RECENT EXAMPLES

This Section describes three different sites that illustrate the dynamics
of race and gender in the context of decentralized, group-based, interactive
organizational decision making. It is intended to lay the foundation for the
next Section, which uses these examples to question the continued validity
of key assumptions about race, gender, and power reflected in prevailing
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legal discourse. These scenarios are drawn from actual events but are not
case studies. They are offered not as accurate depictions of a single
workplace or conflict but rather as illustrations of patterns of interaction
that recur in many workplaces, and yet fall through the cracks of existing
regulatory approaches.3 2 They offer concrete and specific illustrations of
the ways race and gender bias play out in current workplace settings, and
the inadequacy of either formal or informal legal responses to respond to
and address those dynamics. This approach begins the work of articulating
a new, experimental, and inductive methodology I seek to develop for the
law.
A.

De-centeringPower: Self-Directed Work Teams

This example builds on a case reported in the Wall Street Journal
about a suit recently filed against Johnson Wax Corporation by a group of
African-American workers in the component manufacturing plant in
Racine, Wisconsin. 33 These charges of discrimination followed the
company's decision to adopt a self-governing team approach to its
operation. This decision was reportedly made to improve productivity,
make the workplace more interesting and rewarding for the workers, reduce
management costs, and increase the capacity of the company to respond
quickly and proactively to internal problems and external changes in
technology and market conditions.
Under this new system of governance, self-directed work teams make
decisions as a group concerning their daily work operations. These teams
of front-line workers make decisions that would be made by a supervisor or
foreman in a typical bureaucratic organization. The team might decide
who will operate what machines, what breaks would be taken, what types

32. The first two examples draw primarily on events reported in the media, case files,
and reported cases. The third example is based on work I have done consulting with various
universities and companies.
33. See Timothy D. Schellhardt, Race Bias Suit at S.C. Johnson Raises Some WorkerTeam Issues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1997, at B7. The company in question is one that is
widely known for its family-friendly policies and its strong community relations and
service. Johnson and Johnson has made it to the Top Ten List for Working Mothers in six
of the past ten years, based in part on its "flexible schedules, elder care resource and referral
and sick-child care at all four on-site centers." Working Mother Magazine Announces the
"100 Best Companiesfor Working Mothers," Bus. WIRE, Sept. 12, 1997. The company has
also been the subject of periodic allegations of racial and gender discrimination. See Ellen
Neuborne, Temporary Workers Feeling Shortchanged,USA TODAY, Apr. 11, 1997, at 1B
("A group of temporary workers for S.C. Johnson Wax in Racine, Wis., alleges that race and
gender bias has kept them in lower-paid temp positions for years."); Schellhardt, supra (race
discrimination law suit challenging racial impact of self-directed work teams); First
Amended Complaint, Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. (E.D. Wis. 1995) (No. 95-C-0944)
(on file with author).
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of maintenance would be performed, how quality would be checked, and
other routine decisions. In addition, the team might interact with suppliers
and customers. It also takes over many of the human resource functions,
such as hiring and firing decisions, making performance appraisals,
assigning work, and electing supervisors. 34 Finally, a certification board
composed of employees determines issues of merit-pay increases based on
increased proficiency at running production machinery.
Many at the company have described the shift to self-governing teams
as remarkably successful. This form of worker self-governance has been
identified as at the cutting edge of management practices. In one company,
management reported that "the change has speeded up response time,
simplified work for agents, and cut turnover to [eight] percent. ' 35 Some
workers reported that "it's like having your own business. We kind of run
36
the place now. It's fun-it's actually enjoyable to come to work.,
Managers also report that "better decisions get made if in fact you can
move those decisions closer to where the actual work is performed. 37
They pointed to dramatic savings in administrative costs and production
expenses as a result of the new system.
However, the company also appears to have discovered that the move
to team-based management necessarily surfaces tensions and inadequacies
in the company's governance system.38 The success of the team approach
requires explicit attention to issues that managers, workers, and regulatory
regimes alike frequently neglect or avoid. Group based decision making,
while crucial to the fair and productive operation of any workplace,
requires the capacity to engage in constructive conflict, to match incentive
structures with goals and operating strategies, to create processes that
permit the development of workable goals and standards, to experiment and
learn from mistakes, and to build in mechanisms of accountability that keep
this system dynamic in its capacity to monitor both process and results.39
Often groups assume responsibility for decision making about work
and workers, with little or no attention to the structure, process, or skills
34. See John L. Cotton, Does Employee Involvement Work? Yes, Sometimes: The
Quality Function in Redesigned Organizations, 12 J. NuRsING CARE QUALITY 33 (Dec.
1997).
35. Erik Gunn, Breaking the Mold: Johnson Wax Finds It Profitableto Allow Workers
to SelfManage, Police Themselves, MILWAUKEE J., Dec. 10, 1993, at ID.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Mary Ann Jannazo, Firms Shoot for Success with Worker Team Plan, CRAIN's
CLEv. Bus., Nov. 3, 1997, at 23 (quoting organizational consultant who identified a
mismatch between the company goals and incentive structure, that surfaced after the move
to team-based management).
39. Peter Huang, a colleague at the University of Pennsylvania, offered a view of
conflict in Chinese culture as danger plus opportunity. This dual conception captures the
potential relationship of conflict to creativity and innovation.
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shaping that process of governance. 4° The composition of work groups
often changes over time, further complicating the challenge of
implementing fair and effective processes of interaction and decision
making. Yet, the group's capacity to function effectively, fairly, and
efficiently depends substantially on how it deals with conflict. Research on
small group interaction highlights the capacity of groups to deal
constructively with, and indeed to make productive use of, conflict as a key
determinant
of stability, productivity, and long-term commitment to
41
work.
The unavoidable and ubiquitous role of identifiable and shifting
groups in governing workplaces poses particular challenges for addressing
the dynamics of race and gender in the workplace context. 42 The team
concept requires workers to be able to interact effectively as a group, to
address conflict constructively, and to reach consensus about day-to-day
issues. Informal power dynamics, including those around issues of race
and gender, invariably arise in the day-to-day interactions of the team.
These interactions do not take place in a vacuum. They are influenced by
the relationships and perceptions around race and gender that existed prior
to and in conjunction with the move to a team-based system of governance.
Heterogeneous groups of workers assume new power to make decisions
about crucial issues such as work assignments, pay, and promotion. These
decisions reflect patterns of informal, cumulative interactions among
groups of workers, and they frequently are embedded in the day-to-day
interactions of the group. 43 Under these circumstances, social capital,
which is the capacity to gain access to the informal knowledge and
relationships necessary to succeed on the job, plays a significant role in
determining a worker's status and advancement on the job. 44 Exclusion
40. See EDWARD E. LAWLER ET AL., EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND TOTAL QUALITY
MANAGEMENT: PRACTICES AND RESULTS IN FORTUNE 1000 COMPANIES 16-17 (1992) (Most
employees, in a three-year period, did not receive training in interpersonal skills or in the
kinds of technical/analytical skills necessary for them to participate in problem solving
groups and team-based decision making.).
41. See Jehn et al., supra note 15.
42. See Annelise Goldstein, Who's on Top: Unchanging Demographic Patterns,
ORGANIZATIONS, Aug. 1995; Jehn, supra note 14; Thomas & Proudford, supra note 15. See
generally DIvERsITY IN WORK TEAMS: RESEARCH PARADIGMS FOR A CHANGING WORKPLACE

(Susan Jackson ed., 1996).
43. See Thomas & Proudford, supra note 15; Nancie C. Zane, The Discourses of
Diversity: Examining the Links Between Diversity, Structure and Culture (1996)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with author).
44. One recent ethnography of auto repair shops vividly captures this dynamic. See
Nelsen, supra note 18, at 71. Although many of these shops are formally structured as
hierarchies, with one or two formal supervisors and managers overseeing the work of larger
groups of technicians, those who were formal peers of new workers in fact determined the
tenure and economic position of new technicians. Neophytes were unlikely to advance
unless they developed the capacity to successfully negotiate the development of informal
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and bias also can take different forms that are not as visible and that are
more embedded in day-to-day patterns of interaction among the group.
At Johnson Wax, dissatisfaction with the dynamics and consequences
of the team-based management has arisen at least among a group of black
workers.45 Four African-American workers sued Johnson Wax, claiming
that the team-based system of decision making systematically
disadvantages African-Americans in their opportunities for advancement,
their pay, and their day-to-day working conditions. These workers claimed
that they are systematically paid less than their white and male
counterparts, that the decision making process produces biased results, and
that the system of team decision making systematically disadvantages them
in their opportunities to advance within the company. They did not claim
that a particular individual targeted them for less favorable treatment
because of their race. Instead, they claimed that the system of decision
making, which relied on the collective judgments of predominantly white
coworkers, reproduced biases that resulted in less favorable treatment of
black employees.
One of the four plaintiffs, Louise Hardin, already had sued Johnson
Wax in a related case involving allegations that she was subjected to racial
and gender harassment by her former line chief.46 Prior to the
reorganization, line chiefs were hourly production workers ranking below
the level of the supervisor, but they had responsibility for handing out time
cards and distributing vacation and work assignments.
After the
reorganization, these lines of authority were eliminated, and Hardin and her
former line chief were assigned to the same team. Not surprisingly,
plaintiffs' counsel reported that the conflict between them escalated,
culminating in the departure of Hardin and the expansion of the litigation to
include a claim that the team system of governance systematically
discriminates against black workers.
Resistance to the team system was also likely from line chiefs, most of
whom were white males who had marginally greater power than the line
workers under the old system.47 These workers lost that authority under the
knowledge necessary to do the job effectively. This capacity in turn depended on their
ability to learn about and adapt to the work culture and patterns of relationships that opened
up access to the informal knowledge necessary to succeed on the job. Those who were
unable to gain that knowledge and develop those relationships were unlikely to last on the
job.
45. See Schellhardt, supra note 33, at 137. Recent press coverage indicates additional
concerns about the implementation of the team-based management system, including the
evaluation system. See Jannazo, supra note 38, at 23.
46. See First Amended Complaint, Hardin v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. (E.D. Wis.
1995) (No. 95-C-0944) (on file with author).
47. Other research on organizational dynamics and change has identified middle
managers as experiencing the greatest level of tension and differences of opinion, regarding
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new system, in which they were expected to function as equal members of
the team. Although some line chiefs retired from the company, others were
absorbed into the teams. Thus, the Johnson Wax example involves a move
from bureaucratic, hierarchical decision making to decentralized, group
decision making. The success and fairness of teams' decisions then
depends on the capacity of a racially diverse group of people who
previously operated in more traditional hierarchical ways to interact
productively and fairly.
The example of Johnson Wax is offered to illustrate the new kinds of
challenges and circumstances shaping the dynamics of race and gender in
workplaces that have decentralized and diffused power over employment
and production decisions. As companies restructure their workplaces to
respond to changes in technology and the market, they face different kinds
of challenges regarding race and gender dynamics. The issues of conflict
and dissatisfaction that may be most visible around claims of
discrimination reveal more general concerns about effective, productive,
and fair work groups. If racial and gender conflict does emerge, it can have
a dramatic impact on the capacity of the group to perform, as well as on the
capacity of women and people of color to participate fully and fairly in the
workplace. Workers also find themselves in settings managed through
discretionary decisions by shifting groups, which increasingly determine
their status and access to opportunity. The Johnson Wax example thus
poses the question, addressed in the next section, of the capacity of
prevailing legal categories and processes to address these dynamics.
The Johnson Wax example also serves as a reminder of the pervasive
role of law and lawyers in shaping responses to innovation in
organizational structure. Unless the case settles, a court will pass judgment
on whether the team system of governance discriminates based on race.
Lawyers for both plaintiffs and the employer will be translating the
prevailing legal doctrine to their clients, and thereby influencing how
problems of racial dynamics are perceived and how they should be
addressed. The question is: how do the existing categories of legal analysis
and legal intervention analyze the problem, identify responsibility, and
shape remedial responses? Do they offer an approach to these complex
issues that can respond to emerging conditions, without either sidestepping
key sources of bias or stymieing organizational innovation?
Before turning to these more fundamental issues, two other examples
offer variations on these themes. The next example focuses more on the
interpersonal dynamics and the structure of decision making used by a

issues of demographic difference, see Thomas & Proudford, supranote 15, at 31, and moves
to decentralize and flatten hierarchies, see PIORE & SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE
(1984).
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group to make hiring decisions.
B.

Employment Decision Making by Committee: A Case of University
Hiring

Universities, law firms, and accounting firms routinely employ group
based decision making processes to make hiring and promotion decisions.48
These organizations designate committees of faculty or partners who bear
the responsibility of evaluating candidates for hiring or promotion and
making recommendations to the full faculty or partnership. Although
higher level administrative officials may review those decisions (such as
the dean, provost, trustees of a law school, or management committee of a
firm), the faculty or partnership committee plays the most critical role in
determining both the process and the outcome of the decision. Groups
have assumed considerable responsibility for employment decisions, even
in more traditionally structured organizations.
The exercise of judgment lies at the core of these decision making
processes. Individuals and groups must make judgments based on differing
views of the criteria for successful performance and varying assessments of
whether particular individuals meet those criteria. Those assessments are
made in the context of well-established patterns of interaction among the
decision makers and those affected by their decisions. These relationships
in turn shape the assessments of those under consideration. Differing
views of the racial and gender dynamics that underlie the assessment
process frequently operate under the surface and hidden from view.
Employment decisions in these contexts thus offer an opportunity to
examine a context in which groups play a central role in employment
decision making and have done so long before the recent interest in
decentralized, team-based decision making. In addition to this reliance on
groups as primary decision makers, the university setting offers a prime
example of internal dispute resolution processes and their relationship to
the non-legal organizational processes for making decisions. Lam v.
University of Hawaii,49 a recent case challenging a law school's hiring
process, involves a group decision making process which operated without
clear guidelines, criteria, or mechanisms of accountability. The case
provides a good example of the significance of the structure within which
group decisions occur and the inability of current legal categories to take

48. See, e.g., University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1992) (the use of committees
for decision making in universities); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
(accounting firms); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993) (law frmns).
49. 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).
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account of that structural dimension of bias.50 Maivan Clech Lam, a
woman of Vietnamese descent, applied for the position of Director of
Pacific Asian Legal Studies ("PALS") at the University of Hawaii's
The Law School
Richardson School of Law ("the Law School").
established an appointments committee consisting of three professors and
two students to screen applicants and recommend finalists for review by the
full faculty. 5 1 This first committee prepared a list of ten names, including
Lam's. Five of the ten candidateswere women, among whom were two of
the three ethnic Asians recommended. Matsuda, who was a friend of
Lam's, chose Lam as one of her top two candidates.
Matsuda then resigned from the committee, due to a previously
scheduled semester's leave, and a new committee was constituted. The
new chair of the committee, Professor A, had a previous "run-in" with
Lam. Under his leadership, the committee discussed forwarding one name,
that of a white male, rather than ten names, to the faculty. Professor A
spoke extremely critically of Lam at a joint meeting of the appointments
committee and the committee that oversaw the PALS program. As a result,
two faculty members went to the dean to recommend the removal of
Professor A as chair. The dean then announced, without explanation or any
attempt at conflict resolution, that Professor A had resigned from the
committee. The candidate list was narrowed to four, including Lam, whose
applications were considered by the full faculty meeting. At that meeting,
polarized positions about Lam were expressed by Professor A and Lam's
supporters. The underlying polarization and discomfort was not addressed
openly, and the faculty failed to reach a consensus about any particular
candidate, although a white male candidate received the highest number of
votes.
Lam filed an internal discrimination complaint about this process with
the office of the University vice-president. Although the University
rejected her administrative grievance, it issued a report detailing
confidentiality breaches and procedural violations in the PALS search
process. At a law school faculty meeting the following fall, two University
Equal Employment Opportunity officers discussed selection procedures
and recommended, among other things, the use of rating sheets and a clear
definition of the program and the role of its director. At the dean's request,
Professor Matsuda prepared a memo on search procedures for the law

50. See EzoLd, 983 F.2d at 509. Ezold, a sex discrimination case challenging a law
firm's decision denying a plaintiff's promotion to partnership, provides another illustration
of the unrecognized importance of the process structuring group decision making. See
Tracy A. Baron, Comment, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite: The Courts' Failure
to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 267 (1994).
51. The initial committee consisted of Professor Marl Matsuda, who was the chair,
Professors Eric Yamamoto and Randall Roth, and two students. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1555.
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school in which she proposed ranking desired candidates and encouraging
minority applicants. The faculty reopened the search the following year,
and Lam reapplied for the position. The new faculty appointments
committee consisted of three white members of the faculty who did not
support Lam in 1988, along with two students of Asian ancestry. The new
committee proceeded with little guidance for the selection process. The
chair, who had been on leave the previous fall, did not know about the
previous extensive discussions and developments regarding selection
procedures. None of the recommendations concerning the process of
structuring a fair selection process was followed. Little, if any, attention
was paid up front to the criteria or process of decision making. "Despite all
of the past debate over the possibility of discrimination and the need for
careful selection procedures, no mechanism was put into place to screen
out potential bias or retaliatory sentiments resulting from the prior
search. 52
Lam did not appear on any of the committee members' lists. The final
list consisted of persons of United States ancestry, both white and nonwhite, of whom three were women. The faculty met six candidates, three
of whom had applied during the first search and were ranked lower than
Lam. The faculty voted to offer the position to a white Harvard Law
graduate who declined the offer. At this point, the faculty again canceled
the search, without selecting a director. Lam then sued the University,
claiming that both of the selection committees refused to hire her for the
position of director based on her status as an Asian woman.
Lam is offered as an example of the centrality of subjective, groupbased decision making to the hiring and promotion process already in place
in many professional settings and the complexity of the interactions
involving race and gender that emerge.53 Questions about the process and
structure of decision making by the committee, the composition of the
decision making body, and the racial and gender dynamics that predated
the hiring decision lurk just below the surface, but do not appear to have
been explicitly addressed by either the participants or the court. Despite
the court's acknowledgment of the arbitrariness of the decision making
process, the court focused its legal analysis on whether there was evidence
of intentional bias. This framework of analysis led to a finding of
discrimination in the first committee decision and the absence of
discrimination in the second committee decision. 54 This example also
shows the development of internal mechanisms of dispute resolution to
address discrimination claims, that operate internal to the University but

52. Id. at 1558.
53. See also Ezold, 983 F.2d at 510.
54. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1558.
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quite separate from the day-to-day interactions that produced the contested
decision.
C. Replicating the Formal/InformalDichotomy Within the Workplace:
The Examplefrom Sexual and RacialHarassmentProceduresat a
University
The third example involves a description of a university's internal
dispute resolution regime established to address issues of sexual and racial
harassment and its relationship to the external legal regime.55 Many
universities and other employers have created internal mechanisms to
address sexual harassment in particular, often in response to the law of
employer liability. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,56 the Supreme
Court held that an employer is not "automatically" liable for harassment by
a supervisor or employee. More recently in Burlington Industries Inc. v.
Ellerth5 7 and Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,5 8 the Court articulated a
defense to hostile environment sexual harassment by non-managerial
supervisors if the employer has shown that it "exercised reasonable care to
avoid harassment and to eliminate it when it might occur, and that the
complaining employee had failed to act with like reasonable care to take
advantage of the employer's safeguards and otherwise to prevent harm that
could have been avoided. 59 Thus, at least for hostile environment
harassment, if an employer has taken steps to prevent and redress
harassment, that employer can avoid liability under certain circumstances.
The law creates direct incentives, embodied in the liability standard, for
employers to maintain an effective sexual harassment policy. These steps
include setting up effective mechanisms for disseminating the policy
against harassment, educating employees about sexual harassment and how
to avoid it, creating a process that is accessible and effective to respond to
concerns about sexual harassment, taking prompt steps to investigate
complaints of sexual harassment, and taking steps to put a stop to and
redress harassment that has been found to occur. 6°
At least in theory, current law makes the creation of an informal
55. This example is drawn from work I have done consulting with universities and
other organizations concerning the implementation of their sexual harassment policies and
procedures. It is a composite of several organizations, which are not identified here for
reasons of confidentiality.
56. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
57. No. 97-569, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4217 (Apr. 21, 1998).
58. No. 97-282, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4216 (June 26, 1998).
59. Id. at *10.
60. See Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir. 1995); Spicer v. Virginia, 44 F.3d
218 (4th Cir. 1995); Kauffman v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992); Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991).

1998]

RACE, GENDER, AND THE LAW

administrative process a part of the employer's legal obligation. The
adequacy of those processes is essential to the determination of the
employer's liability for sexual harassment that has occurred. 61 This
approach to employer liability blurs formal and informal legal process. It
makes the shadow of the law part of the liability claim. Employers' actions
undertaken to prevent and redress harassment become an explicit focus of
the determination of whether the employer will be held liable at all. If
courts focus their determination on the adequacy of the employers' system
for influencing day-to-day practice, this approach offers the possibility of
self-consciously constructing law in relationship to culture and practice.
The legal standard invites organizations to think about how rules and
policies actually affect practice. Organizations that successfully embody
the proscription of harassment in their systems of decision making and
conflict resolution may avoid liability for individual violations of the rules.
This approach creates incentives for employers and universities to
experiment with ways of translating legal norms 62about sexual harassment
into organizational patterns of liability prevention.
The processes created by organizations to address sexual harassment
(and thereby avoid liability) do not necessarily bridge the divide between
legal norms and organizational practice. I had the opportunity to observe
efforts to implement sexual harassment policies in the course of consulting
with various universities and companies. This work offered an opportunity
to describe in the aggregate the dynamics of internal legal regulation, albeit
in a general and impressionistic manner. To preserve the confidentiality of
individual institutions, what follows is a composite account of those
experiences. This account is intended to suggest recurring patterns that
should be subjected to more rigorous empirical inquiry, rather than as an
accurate or complete description of particular institutional practices.
University X has a sexual harassment policy that basically tracks the
legal standards articulated by the Supreme Court and reflected the
63
regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Notwithstanding the existence of a clearly stated policy prohibiting sexual
and racial harassment, the staff charged with addressing issues of
harassment report that conflicts and problems involving sexual and racial
harassment surface periodically, and within certain subcommunities, recur

61. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII
Liabilility of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81
CORNELL L. REv. 66 (1995).
62. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Segal, Diversify for Dollars, HR MAG., Apr. 1997, at 113;
Jonathan A. Segal, Legal Trends: The Risky Business of Risk Aversion, HR MAG., Feb.

1997, at 113.
63. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,

477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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regularly. Some of the problems concern classic forms of quid pro quo
harassment of individual students or employees by powerful supervisors,
particularly in fields dominated by men, such as engineering, mathematics,
and medicine. Women of color and non-white, foreign-born women report
particular patterns of systematic abuse and vulnerability in lab settings.
Another recurring pattern emerges in the graduate student/faculty advisor
relationship, where the lines of power are blurred, contact is regular, and
the stakes are high. A third pattern involves peer harassment of nonmajority students-students of color, gay, lesbian, and bisexual students,
both in and out of the classroom setting. Finally, the staff charged with
enforcing the sexual harassment policy describe a problem of the
marginalization of faculty who take on an active role in addressing issues
of harassment at the University.
The processes developed to address harassment complaints consist of
two separate tracks: 1) informal counseling and private mediation, and 2)
formal investigation and adversarial hearings. This two-track system
reflects the typical two-sided approach to the legal process, which carves
up regulation into a formal and an informal process for addressing
harassment. The informal system consists of counseling and mediation by
designated resource staff, most often the ombudsman. In essence, this
process treats the problem as a conflict between two individuals, the
complainant and the alleged harasser, and attempts to work out a solution
acceptable to both sides. These resolutions are typically private and
confidential. Indeed, disclosure of the negotiations is itself a breach of
University rules. The institutional decisions, patterns, and culture within
which the harassment takes place are not the focus of the informal
resolution process. Those with responsibility and authority for shaping
day-to-day conduct within the department or school are not necessarily the
ones who are held accountable for or involved in addressing problems of
harassment. Resolutions of conflicts typically focus on how to avoid
contact between the parties in the future, and on whether the behavior was
serious enough to warrant some sanction of the perpetrator and monetary
compensation to the victim. This process enables the affected parties to
avoid a public, adversarial hearing that frequently polarizes departments
and causes considerable pain to both the victim and alleged perpetrator. In
some cases, informal, private dispute resolution offers the only practical
avenue for any form of problem solving.64 However, alternative dispute
resolution rarely generates information or addresses practices that extend
beyond the participants in the immediate dispute, unless a particular
64. Many victims are unwilling to file formal complaints of harassment because of fear
of stigma and retaliation. See, e.g., Margaret S. Stockdale, What We Know and What We
Need to Learn About Sexual Harassment,in SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 3, 17
(Margaret S. Stockdale ed., 1996).
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administrator independently chooses to assume responsibility for follow up.
It usually fails to produce any visible, public norms or programs directed at
the broader problem of harassment.
If the "conflict" cannot be resolved informally, or if the allegations are
sufficiently serious to expose the University to liability if no disciplinary
action is taken, the dispute proceeds to a formal process. A disciplinary
process commences, focused on whether the subject of the complaint has
engaged in sexual harassment, and if so, what the appropriate sanction
should be. The issue in these proceedings focuses on the degree of
blameworthiness of the individual wrongdoer. The complainant is not a
party to the proceedings. The "case" is investigated and "tried" before a
faculty committee. Again, the focus of the inquiry is not on the patterns
that contribute to the harassment or strategies for changing those patterns.
The "dispute" typically emerges as a "he said/she said" conflict between
two individuals. The power dynamics, general incentive structure, and
patterns of conflict within the organization remain uninterrogated, unless
other allegations of harassment against the accused individual exist. The
adequacy of the institutional response frequently focuses on the
thoroughness of the investigation, the fairness of the hearings, the adequacy
of the sanctions imposed, and the degree to which the sexual harassment
policy was disseminated. To the extent the University's handling of the
complaint becomes an issue, the inquiry focuses on whether the
University's procedures were accessible, whether the investigation was
thorough, and whether sanctions imposed for findings of harassment were
sufficiently tough. If the University fails to fire or otherwise seriously
discipline the alleged perpetrator, the complainant then files a lawsuit. The
perception among many in the community, including the staff charged with
handling sexual harassment, is that the higher the status of the alleged
perpetrator, the less likely the individual is to be sanctioned. Many of those
who sue the University leave either before or shortly after they sue. Ranks
close around those who remain. The underlying patterns of relationship
and incentive structures that contribute to abuses of power and to
marginalization of women and people of color remain unchanged.
The dynamics of sexual and racial harassment at University X also
illustrate the centrality of conflict and power dynamics to the way race and
gender conflict is addressed. Although sexual and racial harassment
appears as a conflict about the exclusion or marginalization of women and
people of color, a deeper analysis reveals this conflict as part of a broader
pattern of institutional dysfunction over relational conflict and power. The
University's incentive structure did not generally emphasize relationships,
the appropriate exercise of power in those relationships, and the capacity to
address conflicts in relationships fairly and constructively. Value within
the University setting derived almost entirely from measurable productivity
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of scholarship which would enhance the status of the University as
compared with its peer institutions. Relationships, both in and out of the
classroom, were of secondary importance in the reward structure, the status
hierarchy, and the decisions that shaped status, power, and compensation
within the institution. 65 Abuses of power generally between superiors and
subordinates were not seriously questioned unless they were extreme and
were not considered to be relevant to the "public" domain of decisions.
Sexual and racial harassment was treated as a marginal form of a marginal
concern about fair and respectful relationships. It was further marginalized
as an issue because those who were most concerned about the problem
were women, people of color, administrative staff-members of groups
that are less powerful and more marginal in contexts where harassment is
most likely to occur.
The staff of the resource offices charged with the institutional
responsibility for attempting to resolve harassment complaints frequently
learn over time the patterns of harassment: which departments have
recurring problems, which individuals trigger repeated complaints, which
administrators downplay the significance of complaints or problems around
harassment, and which students or student groups tend to experience
ongoing harassment or marginalization. But staff members do not share
this information, except in informal and often confidential settings, and
rarely act on these patterns except as part of a formal complaint against a
particular individual. The resource officers tend to be women, often
women of color, with little status or credibility among the faculty and
senior administrators. They may have the knowledge and expertise needed
to understand the dynamics and construct institutionally grounded
responses, but they frequently lack the access and opportunity to explore
systemic approaches to the problem of harassment. In contrast, those with
the power to address harassment as part of the overall incentive structure
and culture of the organization lack the information, expertise, and
incentive to do so. They often do not know of the subtle but pervasive
patterns of group inclusion and exclusion that can underlie harassment
complaints. Administrative authority for addressing sexual harassment
rotates regularly, and department chairs and administrators often do not
know that they bear legal responsibility for taking effective action to
address harassment and that their action (or inaction) legally binds the
university around issues of harassment.
65. Teaching, mentoring, and community building reportedly played a secondary role in
tenure and promotion decisions. Abusive treatment of students, staff, and junior faculty also
went unsanctioned, unless the behavior resulted in a complaint of sufficient magnitude to
expose the University to legal liability. Professors who brought in substantial grant income
or produced large quantities of scholarship were perceived by the advocacy community as
relatively immune from responsibility for abusive, harassive behavior.
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The advocacy groups interested in such issues also function in a
vacuum. They interact primarily with women and people of color who
seek help in dealing with their experiences of harassment and in attempting
to educate and organize the community to take action. They have access to
patterns of experience and strong incentives to reshape those patterns but
lack the opportunity to harness this knowledge to day-to-day practices
within the university. In part because they are deeply skeptical about the
willingness of high level administrators to take meaningful action in the
face of harassment, advocacy groups frequently assume an adversarial
posture that attempts to place blame and responsibility on particular
individuals and to encourage complainants to sue the university
individually. These suits, even when successful, tend to become focused
on how serious the conduct of the offender was, and whether the university
took adequate action in response. They have not focused attention and
energy on the underlying patterns or on the consequences to the broader
community's relationships or productivity of those patterns. Advocacy
groups are perceived by those in power as "political," adversarial, and
focused on finding discrimination wherever they look. Advocates are
frequently marginalized at or excluded from pivotal decisions about policy
and organizational structure. They react to crises, mobilize for brief
periods, and then fade back into the margins of the institution.
These three examples bring to the surface the kinds of interactions
within organizations that frequently remain hidden in legal discourse and
yet are so central to the way race, gender, and the law actually operate in
many workplaces. They are intended to illustrate more general patterns
that accompany shifting systems of workplace governance. They reflect
the interactive group dynamics of power, race, and gender. These
examples highlight the structural, embedded character of decisions
involving race and gender, and the importance of these dynamics to the
capacity of organizations to function fairly and effectively. The next
section builds on these examples to identify emerging themes and their
implications for the adequacy of the current system for regulating
discrimination.
II.

RETHINKING ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING LEGAL APPROACHES TO
RACE, GENDER, AND ORGANIZATIONS

A.

The Locus of Power over Workplace Status

In the three examples described above, power over day-to-day
decisions about workplace status has been exercised in ways that depart
from the traditional bureaucratic model. Decision making was pushed
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downward in the organization, and power was spread among shifting
groups of employees, often without a formal supervisory or managerial
role. Employees who look identical on the organizational chart make
pivotal decisions about each other. The line between supervisors and
employees blurs considerably. The people who make decisions for the
organization, who exercise the organization's legally relevant authority, are
more decentralized and dispersed. That power is also constantly shifting.
Workers rotate roles and responsibilities. Formal positions do not define
actual authority to influence the status and future of other workers on the
team.
This move toward more interactive, nonhierarchical approaches to
day-to-day governance within organizations challenges basic assumptions
embodied in current legal doctrine about how organizations operate. Just
this past term, the Supreme Court reiterated the premise that underlies its
approach to employer liability in sexual and racial harassment cases:
As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other person
acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of
[direct economic injury]. A co-worker can break a co-worker's
arm as easily as a supervisor, and anyone who has regular contact
with an employee can inflict psychological injuries by his or her
offensive conduct .... But one co-worker (absent some elaborate
scheme) cannot dock another's pay, nor can one co-worker
demote another. Tangible employment actions fall within the
special province of the supervisor. The supervisor has been
empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent to make
economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her
control. 66
The Supreme Court's assumption about how power is typically
deployed in organizations reflects the bureaucratic paradigm of
management that has dominated legal discourse. Current analysis of
employer liability for conduct of its agents focuses on the distinction
between managers, supervisors, and coworkers, and assumes that the power
to make decisions affecting employment status correlates with the level of
formal power in the organization. 67 This assumption is strongly reflected in
66. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, No. 97-569, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4217, at *36-37
(Apr. 21, 1998).
67. This assumption is shared by many courts and commentators alike. See Guess v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1990); Garcia v. ANR Freight Sys., 942 F.
Supp. 351 (N.D. Ohio 1996); Christine Merriman & Cora G. Yang, Employer Liabilityfor
Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 93
(1984-85); Ronald Turner, Title VII and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment:
Mislabeling the Standard of Employer Liability, 71 U. DaT. MERCY L. REv. 817 (1994);
Philip D. Brandt et al., Note, Employment Discrimination,64 GaO. WASH. L. REv. 1148,
1168 (1996).
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the law on employer liability in the context of sexual and racial
harassment. 68 It is certainly not a new insight to suggest that this top-down,
black box treatment of organizations is flawed. Even within organizations
that are structured along traditional hierarchical lines, researchers have
questioned the validity of the assumption that formal power to determine
economic and social position equates with power as it is actually expressed
and practiced at the level of the shop floor.69 Certainly, organizations such
as universities have used "decentralized" decision making about promotion
and tenure long before the recent trend.7 °
But recent developments in organizational practice that actively
embrace decentralized decision making widen the gap between standard
legal analysis and organizational practice. Contrary to the assumptions of
prevailing case law (and the approach of many lawyers interpreting that
case law to their clients), traditional, bureaucratic structures may not
accurately depict the structure of governance in a growing proportion of the
economy. 71 Although studies attempting to assess the prevalence of these
68. Sexual harassment by high level managers in a position to bind an organization
triggers vicarious liability. Supervisors who make decisions resulting in "tangible harm"
provoke liability, which employers may avoid by successfully interposing an affirmative
defense that they acted reasonably in addressing the problem. See Burlington, 1998 U.S.
LEXIS 4217; see also Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding employer not
liable for hostile work environment created by supervisor when employee could not
reasonably believe that the supervisor had explicit or implicit authority to harass her and that
the employer had an effective anti-harassment policy). Employers are only liable for
coworker harassment if they have constructive knowledge of the wrongful behavior and fail
to act. See Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding when
harassment is committed by an employee's coworkers, the employer is liable if the
employee shows the employer failed to provide a reasonable avenue for complaint or knew
of the harassment but did nothing about it).
69. See NONET & SELZNICK, supra note 23; REEs, supra note 23, at 24-25; Austin,
supra note 20; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 6.
70. See Lam v. University of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1560 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The principal
defendant in this case is the University, which has delegated to the faculty near-total control
over hiring. The faculty, first in committee, then as a whole, reviews applications, chooses
the final candidates, and votes on whether to extend any candidate an offer of
employment.").
71. For examples from the case law of other workplaces that have decentralized
authority for employment decision making, see Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d
1170, 1174-75 (2d Cir. 1996) (plaintiff was part of a team assembled to prepare a
competitive bid for the sports-insurance account of the World University Games); Smith v.
The Bern' Co., No. CIV.A.96-1899, 1997 WL 358123 (E.D. La. June 24, 1997) (case arose
out of the company's adoption of a new employment plan which changed the task structure
and method of compensation to reward team rather than individual performance); Hearn v.
General Elec., 927 F. Supp. 1486, 1489 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (new plant manager reorganized
"plant's administrative structure, changing it from a traditional 'supervisory' one, in which
forepersons and other administrators supervised by giving orders, into a 'team' structure, in
which employees would confront issues and resolve problems more through interaction and
cooperation among themselves"); Rivera v. PrudentialIns. Co., No. 95-CV-0829, 95-CV-
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types of structural reorganizations are inconclusive, there are indications
that organizations in both the public and private sector are experimenting
with systems of governance in ways that depart dramatically from the
bureaucratic, hierarchical paradigm depicted in the case law. 2 Johnson
Wax's experimental approach to workplace governance is not unique.
Developments in technology and market demand have placed pressure on
companies to find ways to increase adaptability and to connect decision
making authority with information about production, markets, workers-in
short, with information that exists at the level of production or service
delivery. 3 This pressure encourages employers to decentralize decision
making authority. 74 Many companies have experimented with some forms
of decentralized decision
making, although most have not moved entirely
75
to self-governing teams.
76
The Supreme Court's description of power in Burlington Industries

does not provide an adequate framework for addressing the emergence of
the team-based structures of the type employed at Johnson Wax. In
situations where power does not correspond to formal status, the distinction
between managers, supervisors, and coworkers is arbitrary, at least with
respect to their capacity to impose tangible adverse consequences on other
employees. For example, if a full professor engages in harassment of an
untenured professor, is that supervisory harassment? That professor will
ultimately function as a direct decision maker concerning the untenured
faculty member's continued employment.
Yet, there is no formal
supervisory relationship between the full professor and the untenured
professor. By analyzing the dynamics of power in relationship to
traditional categories of bureaucratic position that do not reflect patterns of
organizational governance in many workplaces, the current doctrinal
framework offers no coherent, principled framework for assessing the way
power is exercised in the workplace and the employer's appropriate
responsibility for how that power is exercised. Perhaps the Court would
treat workplaces like Johnson Wax as falling within the exception to the

0830, 1996 WL 637555, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1996) (plaintiff was assigned to a team of
customer service representatives (CSR) that was led by an another more experienced CSR
who was designated the team leader).
72. See LAWLER ET AL., supra note 40, at 2 (results of survey showed significant
adoption rates for employee involvement; although many key practices had only recently
been adopted, many organizations practiced employee involvement in only part of the
organization, and in many cases organizations adopted limited changes); MALCOLM K.
SPARROW, IMPOSING DuTIEs: GovERNMENT's CHANGING APPROACH TO COMPLIANCE (1994);
Doff & Sabel, supra note 6.
73. See HARvEY, supra note 6, at 147.
74. See PIORE & SABEL, supra note 8, at 35-36; Barenberg, supra note 8, at 890-93.
75. See LAWLERETAL., supra note 40.

76. No. 97-569, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4217 (Apr. 21, 1998).
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usual allocation of power characterized in Burlington Industries, as an
aberration (or "elaborate scheme"). However, the Court does not offer any
guidance as to how those "exceptional" cases fit into the conceptual
structure that applies to these cases.
Legal analysis that focuses on questions of formal status or position
may bear no relation to the actual process of decision making or the
capacity or predisposition to abuse power in ways that implicate
discrimination. By failing to explicitly engage with intermediate structures
of governance within organizations, legal actors risk misdefining the
problem, and in so doing, misdirecting efforts to avoid liability or comply
with the legal norm. The project of developing an effective regulatory
regime requires the capacity to ask the right questions that focus attention
on the level at which power is exercised and the incentive structures that
shape current behavior. The current categories of analysis ignore or
discount the intermediate level of worker interaction, that is often central to
either encouraging or minimizing the expression of bias. Lawyers design
employment systems that focus exclusively on either formal policy or
identifying and disciplining individuals who are visibly engaging in
discrimination. The underlying patterns that encourage the expression of
bias, produce exclusionary dynamics, and undermine productivity remain
untouched.
B.

The Neglect of IntermediateLevel, Group DecisionMaking Processes
in Law and Theories of Regulation

Each of the examples described in the previous Section involves a
complex and intertwined relationship between individual and group action.
Teams, committees, panels, and other groups frequently determine both the
day-to-day experience and the outcome of pivotal decisions in the
workplace.7 7 Groups play a key role in decision making, determining
access to training, job assignments, salary, vacations, and advancement
within the organization. These decisions are the culmination of interactions
and decisions that may be difficult to isolate or trace to a particular event or
individual. The capacity of any individual to influence the outcome of the
decision is a function of the structure of decision making within the group
as well as the informal relationships and power within the group formally
charged with decision making responsibility. Within the group as a whole,
informal subgroups develop that structure interactions and power in ways
that can profoundly affect the relationships and status of women, people of
color, and other non-dominant subgroups. 78 At the same time, this group

77. See Barenberg, supra note 8, at 891.
78. See Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1176 (2d Cir. 1996) (female
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dynamic has been mapped onto a set of more traditionally defined
hierarchical relationships between individuals. Particular individuals may
continue to have enhanced power as a residue of the old system or as a
result of formal status differences. 79 These individuals may have a
profound impact on the functioning and outcome of group interactions. 80
They may also act in ways that focus attention on individual acts of racial

or gender bias.
Individual decision makers exercise judgment within a particular
organizational and social context. Research by organizational and social
psychologists shows that the process used to make group decisions

dramatically affects the reliability, fairness, and validity of the evaluation
process.

Collective decision making can be structured to minimize bias

and enhance reliability. Participants in group decision making can develop
skills that equip them to recognize bias, address conflict constructively, and
reduce the influence of stereotypes on the outcome.81 The developing
literature on benchmarking provides a distinct yet complementary

member of team marginalized within group, excluded from collaboration, and subjected to
offensive remarks; after complaining, she was fired because "she wasn't being a team
player"); Rivera v. Prudential Ins. Co., No. 95-CV-0829, 95-CV-0830, 1996 WL 637555, at
*3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1996) (plaintiff who complained about harassing behavior by
assistant team leader subjected to "silent treatment' by coworkers, which created extremely
high levels of stress and ultimately led to the termination of their employment). See
generally RosABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 47-48 (1977);
Jehn, supra note 14 (according to social identity theory, group members establish a positive
social identity and confirm affiliation by showing favoritism for members of their own
social category-in effect via discrimination and self-segregation that disrupts group
interaction).
79. See Thomas & Proudford, supranote 15.
80. This power may be expressed or made visible through statements or conduct that
reflects racial or gender bias. For example, in the Johnson Wax example, the plaintiff filed
a sexual/racial harassment claim alleging that her quasi-supervisor repeatedly harassed her
and made offensive comments that created a hostile work environment. The plaintiff
alleged that this individual called African-American women workers "black bitches" and
singled out black women for disparaging and hostile treatment. See Interview with Willie
Nunnery, Counsel for Plaintiff. The workplace was subsequently reorganized into selfdirected teams, with the plaintiff and her former quasi-supervisor assigned to the same work
group. In Lam v. University of Hawaii, the chair of the appointments committee, Professor
A, wielded considerable power as a result of his position as chair and as a tenured member
of the faculty. At the same time, his influence was mediated through the entire committee.
See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1556-60.
81. See Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992); WAYNE F.
CAscIo, APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 77 (3d ed. 1987); SusAN T.
FisKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 139-81 (1984); Susan T. Fiske & Shelley
E. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formationfrom Category Based to Individuating
Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and Interpretation, in 23
ADVANCES IN EXPERiMENTAL INTERPRETATION

(M. Zanna ed., 1988). EEOC Guidelines

incorporate some of this research in the requirements for criterion validation studies. See 29
C.F.R. § 1607.5(B) (1998).
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systematic approach to structure discretion in ways that link productivity,
fairness, and minimization of bias by group decision makers. This
structural approach employs systems of decision making that aggregate and
reflect on similar, related, or clustered incidents or problems in relation to
articulated criteria and goals. This iterative process enables groups and
organizations to accurately label problems and dysfunctions in
organizational decision making and to search for appropriate solutions and
systems of accountability. a
Decisions made through highly unstructured processes on an ad hoc
basis, without specified criteria, articulated reasons, deliberation, and
accountability of decision makers, are considerably more likely to reflect
83
the motivational and cognitive biases held by individual decision makers.
Teams or groups that lack the capacity to express and resolve conflict
frequently play out the underlying causes of that conflict in their
employment decisions, such as hiring, promotion, and job assignment. 84
Unarticulated racial and gender dynamics can have a profound impact on
conflict and decision making of groups. Although the exercise of
discretion is both unavoidable and in many instances desirable,
organizations can and do shape the processes by which discretion is
exercised. The important question is not whether groups use discretion in
making employment decisions but rather how groups exercise discretion.
The criteria, processes, and mechanisms of accountability used by the
group fundamentally determine the legitimacy, fairness, and outcomes of
discretionary decision making processes.
These insights about the structures for exercising discretion, which are
familiar concepts in the industrial psychology and group process literature,
fall through the cracks of much legal analysis. The inquiry prompted by
the current legal regime fails to take account of this intermediate and
crucial level of organizational decision making. Standard legal analysis
typically focuses on either a search for individual bad actors or on policies
instituted at the top of the organization that produce discriminatory
results. 85 Individuals typically constitute the basic unit of analysis for
82. See SPARRow, supra note 72, at 45 (describing a similar process used in problem
oriented public service management); Charles F. Sabel, Bootstrapping Refonn: Rebuilding
Finns, the Welfare State, and Unions, 23 PoL. & Soc. 5, 36 (1995) ("mhe parties proceed,
as in disciplined discussion, by agreeing on what they understand, defining what they would
like to know beyond that, and deciding how to explore the knowable and the doable jointly,
with reference to precise but corrigible interim goals. Continuous discussion of efforts to
reach those targets then becomes simultaneously the means of revising the goals and
monitoring the partners' performances and capacities; because learning and monitoring are
inextricably connected in this relation, I refer to it as learning by monitoring.").
83. See Krieger,supra note 14, at 1199-1211.
84. See Jehn, supra note 14; Thomas & Proudford, supra note 15.
85. See Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997) (focusing on sexual
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purposes of determining wrongful conduct. The first step is to determine if
there is a individual whose statements or conduct shows that race or gender
bias motivates their actions. 86 A court analyzing the Johnson Wax
allegations would ask, were there statements by individuals who played a
role in the decision making process that demonstrate discriminatory bias
against the plaintiff? Did they motivate his behavior with respect to her?
Was he in a position to shape the day-to-day conditions of her work?
Similarly, the court in Lam v. University of Hawaii inquired as to whether
Professor A or other participants in the decision making process spoke or
acted in a way that indicated that their selection decision was motivated by
gender or ethnicity. These statements were not analyzed in relation to the
structure or process of decision making that shaped the impact of the
individual on the group or the capacity of the group to deal with bias when
it arose.
Once an individual discriminator is identified, the next step under
existing doctrine would be to attempt to determine the relationship of the
individual acts of bias to the overall decision making process. This often
takes the form of attempting to disaggregate the decision making team into
a series of individual actors and then determine how much influence the
individual bad actor had on the outcome of the decision.8 7 If the plaintiff
did not fare well under the team-based system, did the sexist/racist
individual play a significant role in producing the decisions that kept her
from advancing, from getting raises, from getting good work assignments?
Were comparable white male employees treated differently?
This analysis proceeds from the assumption that employment
decisions necessarily result from the exercise of discretion and that this
individual exercise of discretion is not itself discriminatory. Unless that
discretion is demonstrably motivated by bias or the decision making
process is so arbitrary that it cannot be explained except as bias, then the
law has no further role in monitoring or regulating the exercise of
discretion as it affects bias. The group level of practice is almost invisible,
in both factual and legal analysis. When groups are addressed, courts treat
them as aggregations of individuals, rather than dynamic entities that
emerge from structural decisions and patterns. This approach does not
focus attention on the level at which decisions actually take place. The
intermediate level of the group falls between the cracks of the individual

harassment policy articulated at the top of the organization and procedures in place for
responding to individual violations of that policy).
86. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ.,
729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984). In situations where no explicit employment action is taken, the
question is whether the racial or gender based harassment is sufficiently severe or abusive to
change the conditions of the workplace.
87. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228; Krieger, supra note 14.
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bad actor and the organization as a whole. The emphasis on individuals to
the exclusion of groups as decision makers focuses attention on the most
extreme form of conduct that bubbles to the surface, but which frequently
reflects and emerges out of group patterns.
If no particular bad actor can be identified, then the focus of legal
analysis shifts to the company's overall policy or practice that causes a
discriminatory outcome. This inquiry may proceed within the framework
of disparate impact analysis. Did the organization as an entity use a
selection practice or criteria, such as an interview or a team based decision
making process, that had a disproportionate impact and could not be
justified by business necessity? 88 If the interview or decision making
process produced a discriminatory outcome, courts typically ask the
question whether the exercise of discretion was appropriate under the
circumstances. Did the job at issue require a skill that could not be
assessed objectively? If so, was an interview an appropriate way to
evaluate the candidate's ability? Then courts frequently conclude that the
process satisfies business necessity and is thus not discriminatory.89 There
is little if any attention paid to the process of decision making, the systems
of accountability, the articulation of criteria, or the steps taken to minimize
the expression of individual bias in the decision making process. 90
The other avenue for challenging a subjective selection process is a
pattern and practice claim. 91 This claim relies heavily on statistical data
and requires a showing that the employer engaged in a pattern and practice
of discrimination, supported by a statistical pattern of racial or gender
under-representation. 92 The focus of the inquiry in these cases is on
88. See Civil Rights Act of 1991,2 U.S.C. § 703(k)(1) (1991).
89. Courts have rejected the requirement of test validation for interviews largely
because of the difficulty of validating these types of selection criteria. Interviews and other
selection processes assessing general abilities and traits, such as intelligence or leadership,
can only be validated using construct validation. As the Supreme Court recognized in
Vatson, this form of validation is both prohibitively expensive and almost always
unsuccessful. As a result, the Court articulated an extremely weak test of business necessity
to govern disparate impact cases involving subjective employment practices. See Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
90. See id. at 977; West Virginia Univ. v. Deckerm, 447 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1994).
91. See, e.g., Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1988); Stender v.
Lucky Stores, 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
92. The underlying legal theory for pattern in practice cases was first expressed in a
footnote in Teamstersv. United States,431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977):
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative.., only because
such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent
explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring
practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the
racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which
employees are hired. Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity between the
composition of a workforce and that of the general population thus may be
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pervasive and conscious discrimination practiced at every level of the
organization. Was the process so arbitrary and laden with bias that it can
only be explained as a pretext for the exercise of bias? Again, this inquiry
overlooks the process of constructing and reinforcing bias at the level of
ordinary team interactions and decision making. Instead, pattern and
practice analysis focuses attention on the pervasiveness of conscious,
intentional bias.
The court's analysis of the selection processes used in Lam
exemplifies the pattern of focusing either on individual bias or top-down
policy, to the exclusion of the structural level. The University's first search
for the position of director of the Pacific Asian Legal Studies program
proceeded without any clear guidelines or structure. The court found that
this first stage of the selection process was discriminatory. It expressly
recognized the arbitrary nature of the first committee's decision making,
and described in some detail the recommendations made by EEOC
representatives to establish a more fair, less biased system of decision
making. The court also acknowledged that the second committee charged
with overseeing the selection process completely ignored the EEOC
recommendations and proceeded again in an entirely ad hoc manner. The
absence of a systematic, racially diverse, and accountable method of
decision making heightened the risk that bias would result. Yet, the court
in no way linked its analysis of discrimination in the second process to the
inadequate structure of the process. It found no discrimination based on its
conclusion that there was no evidence of either individual bias or decisions
by high level administrators that expressed bias. Its description of the
inadequacies of the decision making process93 played no role in its
determination of the dynamics of discrimination.

The doctrinal neglect of the structural, group level as a focus of
inquiry also shapes how lawyers interpret and translate legal norms for
their organizational clients. If practice guides and personal experience are
indicative, lawyers tend to focus on developing formal procedures to
punish wrongdoers and clear rules to establish policy and to ignore the
incentive structure and group dynamics that often perpetuate the pattern of
conduct.94 The structural dimension is frequently overlooked even in the
context of sexual harassment, in which courts have created incentives to
significant even though.. . Title VII imposes no requirement that a workforce
mirror the general population.
93. See Lam v. University of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1551 (1994).
94. See, e.g., ELLEN J. WAGNER, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: How TO
PREVENT, INVESTIGATE, AND RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN YouR ORGANIZATION (1992); Jana
Howard Carey & E. Anne Hamel, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 426 P.L.I. Litig. 7
(1992); Julie M. Tamminen, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Managing Corporate
Policy, Disp. REsOL. J., Jan. 1995, at 85, 85 (1994).
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95
develop effective internal mechanisms for addressing sexual harassment.

C.

Patternsof Advancement and Exclusion: Blurring the Boundaries
Between Working Conditionsand Employment Opportunities

In organizational structures like Johnson Wax, people do not get ahead
by applying for promotional opportunities that are defined in advance and
posted for competitive bidding. Indeed, it is often difficult to know in
advance whether a particular opportunity or assignment constitutes a step
toward promotion. Discrete decisions about advancement blur into
decisions about day-to-day roles and responsibilities that are made by the
group. Assessments of performance, which determine opportunities for
more challenging work and advancement, are more likely to be embedded
in day-to-day interactions and decisions. Opportunities to get ahead are a
function of building skills and relationships among diverse groups of
people, both within the work group and in other parts of the organization
and its environment. In the context of this dynamic and shifting set of
power relationships and opportunities, it is difficult to isolate a single
decision as the defining act of promotion or exclusion. Similarly, acts that
alone do not define a worker's status or opportunity are inextricably linked
to a broader pattern of conduct that produces decisions about who advances
in the organization.
These embedded patterns of relationships interact in significant ways
with race, gender, and other salient categories of difference. Nontraditional
workers often remain outside these crucial networks of interaction and
advancement, not necessarily due to intentional motivation. Social science
research consistently documents the common desire to work with people
who are familiar and similar.96 Recent work in cognitive psychology also
shows that evaluations of members of identifiable and salient groups often
reflect judgments made based on pre-existing frames of ieference about
members of those groups. 97 Research on small groups shows that the
unacknowledged conflict within diverse groups frequently reinforces these
selective patterns of interaction to produce informal patterns of exclusion
from critical aspects of occupational development. The consequences of
these more subtle patterns of interaction can be just as stark in terms of the
denial of access to opportunity based on race or gender. But the causes and
potential solutions for these patterns of exclusion can only be understood as
part of a broader analysis of the role of social capital in creating access and
opportunity.

95. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
96. See Jehn, supra note 14; Schultz, supra note 18.
97. See Krieger, supra note 14.
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In contrast to this embedded and interactive approach to employment
decision making, case law rests on the assumption that identifiable and
discrete moments of decision produce outcomes that determine economic
and organizational status. Several important doctrinal areas exemplify this
assumption. The courts' approach to mixed motive and direct evidence
discrimination focuses on determining the connection between statements
98
showing discriminatory motivation and the moment of decision.
Similarly, the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment
discrimination, recently elaborated on by the Supreme Court, rests on the
possibility of distinguishing between decisions that have an adverse impact
on the employee and other decisions that only affect the conditions under
which an employee works. 99 This approach assumes the existence of
formal progressions, job descriptions, seniority systems, or some other
hierarchical and formal structure for decision making about pay, job
assignment, and promotion. This approach also assumes that decisions that
have an adverse impact on an employee's status can be separated from
decisions only affecting the conditions under which work is performed. In
the emerging workplace, that distinction is harder and harder to draw.
D. Law's Assumptions About andImpact on Workplace Conflict
Involving Race and Gender
In each of the examples described above, organizations were
structured in ways that required diverse individuals to interact regularly and
reach decisions about issues that matter to each of the participants. Under
these circumstances, conflict is inevitable. Even among homogeneous
groups, conflict will arise. When groups of people with different skills,
mindsets, backgrounds and interests interact, disagreements about tasks,
values, and personal relationships are a fact of organizational life. 1°° One
of the goals of moving decision making responsibility to team-based,
functionally integrated groups rests on an acknowledgment of the value of
information-based conflict as a means of generating organizational and
group learning. This learning occurs as a consequence of articulating
different strategies for solving problems, making errors, generating conflict
among differing perspectives, and evaluating results in relation to

98. See id. Krieger critiques the case law for failing to take into account the nature of
cognitive processes in structuring memory, interpretation, judgment, and decision making. I
am offering an additional critique based on changes in patterns of opportunity in the
workplace.
99. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, No. 97-282, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4216, at *53-61 (1998).
100. See DivERsrrY IN WORK TEAMS, supra note 42; Jehn, supra note 14; Thomas &
Proudford, supra note 15.
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articulated goals. 101 Tasks that require developing new ideas or making
decisions under conditions of uncertainty or complexity will likely produce
conflict. Inevitable differences within work groups stemming from diverse
backgrounds, values, and experiences contribute to the multiplicity of
responses to uncertainty. 10 2 Research also clearly establishes that relational
conflict (based on personal likes and dislikes) is inevitable, linked to racial
and gender difference, and destructive to the capacity of groups to function
effectively and fairly. As the work of Karen Jehn demonstrates, functional
groups have several key capacities relating to conflict: (1) the capacity to
address conflict openly, (2) the capacity to translate relational conflict into
issues of experience, knowledge, and perspective, and (3) the capacity to
use conflict to redefine problems and develop creative, inclusive responses
to those problems that respond to identifiable concerns underlying the
conflict.10 3 Thus, conflict is a normal, inevitable, and potentially
constructive aspect of work, especially in decentralized, team-based
governance structures.
Racial and gender conflict in work groups and organizations like those
described in Section II develop in interaction with more general patterns
and processes for addressing group conflict and power differentials. The
capacity of multi-racial teams1 4 to treat non-majority group members as
full-fledged participants in the group depends in large part on the general
capacities of the work group to address conflict, to learn from each other,
and to address the interests and concerns of each member of the group. At
the same time, racial and gender dynamics affect the group's capacity
generally to handle conflict constructively, to adapt to internal and external
demands on the group, and to generate usable information about how to
address recurring problems.
Current legal approaches to racial and gender dynamics in the
workplace tend to embody an entirely different set of assumptions about
conflict. These assumptions shape processes of decision making in
organizations in ways that can prevent groups from developing the capacity
to address conflict constructively, particularly if that conflict involves
racial or gender difference. Legal regulation of employment discrimination
focuses on conflict as personal (and thus legally irrelevant) unless it
directly involves an employment decision, and workplace conflict as
irrelevant unless it reflects racial or gender bias. 05 Personal conflict is

101. See Doff & Sabel, supra note 6; Sabel, supra note 82, at 36.
102. See Jehn, supra note 14.
103. See id.

104. See, for example, those established by Johnson Wax to govern workplace decision
making.
105. This point, which emerged in conversations with Charles Sabel, will be developed
further in a forthcoming article we are writing together on rethinking discrimination
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addressed, if at all, through private efforts at dispute resolution aimed at
eliminating the conflict and restoring order, if not harmony. Workplace
conflict is addressed through a formal adversarial process that attempts to
determine whether race or gender played a role in decision making, in
which case the accused is at fault and subject to sanctions. These tracks for
addressing conflict construct racial and gender conflict as either irrelevant
or aberrational. The law appears to assume that, absent racist or sexist
motivation, race and gender identity does not enter into workplace decision
making, and if it does, the goal is to suppress or remove any focus on race,
gender, or other categories of difference. Indeed, the current emphasis on
color-blindness as the norm suggests that explicit acknowledgment of race
and gender dynamics may be interpreted as bias.
Internal dispute resolution processes designed to address claims of
sexual and racial harassment also reflect this false dichotomy between
personal disputes and violations of workplace norms. Informal systems of
mediation that many institutions have created target the private interactions
of two individuals. A neutral third party attempts to resolve the personal
disagreement or conflict between the complainant and the accused. The
formal disciplinary system focuses on adjudicating rule violations. Third
parties to the conflict necessarily oversee this process. The managers and
work group members who govern and operate within the workplace system
that constructs the general pattern of conflict and power remain outside of
and often irrelevant to either the informal or formal conflict resolution
process. Not surprisingly, the patterns that produce sexual and racial
harassment and exclusion in workgroups and teams frequently remain
unchanged, even when conflicts are effectively resolved at the formal or
informal level.
E. Reprise: The Dynamics of Racial and Gender Bias in the Emerging
Workplace
Legal regulation within the prevailing paradigm treats racial and
gender discrimination as an issue of individual fault, reflected in conscious
or unconscious, racial-or gender-based motivation. Race and gender
function within this framework as fixed, static categories of victims based
on membership in a set, unchanging group defined by physical
characteristics such as skin color. Bias emerges from individual decisions
that deliberately or unconsciously take race or gender into account in ways
that adversely affect a member of a particular social group. Race and
gender analysis is important to protect the interests of the disfavored group.
In this sense, it is a special interest inquiry: the issues of race and gender
regulation.
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are important only to those who care about the status and access of those
within the disfavored groupY°6
However, this way of defining the problem of racial and gender bias
and exclusion fails to capture the dynamics of the emerging workplace or
to reflect the results of recent psychological and organizational research.
Bias is produced not only as a result of motivation but also as a product of
racial or gender schemata, 1' 7 multi-racial group interactions, and patterns of
conflict resolution or avoidance. The salience of race or gender depends on
the particular composition of a workplace and the projects or problems
facing that workplace. Bias or exclusion often results from interactive
patterns of non-inclusion in the networks and informal learning
opportunities of a workplace, as much as from exclusion motivated by bias.
Racial and gender bias is often reflective of and affected by deeper patterns
of institutional dysfunction around power, conflict, and decision making.
Under these circumstances, organizations cannot change racial bias without
taking account of the structure that produces that bias. At the same time,
organizations often cannot see deeper patterns of dysfunction that affect
broader interests without examining the impact of these patterns on visible,
marginalized groups.108 Effective responses to these deeper forms of
dysfunction and exclusion prompt systemic change that can benefit the
whole organization. Thus, race and gender concerns offer a much needed
catalyst for the continual organizational reflection that the new forms of
organizational governance require.
F.

The Inadequacy of FormalRules and After-the-FactEnforcement to
Address Racialand GenderBias in the Emerging Workplace

As organizations move in the direction of decentralized, team-based
systems of production and governance, crucial aspects of their decision
making become less amenable to effective regulation via enforcement of
formal, universal legal rules dealing with discrimination. Rules proscribing
intentional discrimination will not reach much of the behavior that
produces identity-based exclusion.
Workplaces are increasingly
reorganizing to enable the exercise of judgment and discretion at lower
levels of formal power.1 9 This discretion is crucial to the capacity to adapt

106. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 19.
107. "Schemata" are frames of reference for organizing our interpretations, attention,
memory, and emotions. There is now considerable empirical evidence that cross-racial
interactions are shaped by racial schemata-well developed frames of reference or theories
for organizing information about race. See generally Krieger, supra note 14.
108. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 19.
109. See SPARROW, supra note 72, at 72-80; Doff & Sabel, supra note 6; see also supra
notes 9 & 10.
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in the new working environment. The exercise of discretion is unlikely to
be prohibited by the courts and will be strongly resisted by managers. At
the same time, it is in the exercise of individual and group-based
discretionary decision making that racial and gender bias frequently
operates. A rule-driven approach by definition either eliminates discretion
or bypasses the sites where discretion operates. An effective system of
discrimination regulation would thus both permit and discipline the
exercise of discretion to make it accountable, fair, and unbiased (as well as
productive of information that can be used to inform subsequent decisions).
This cannot be accomplished solely through a system focused on
determining, after-the-fact, that individual decision makers and
organizational policies have complied with pre-established, universal rules.
The nature of discrimination itself makes a rule-oriented approach to
discrimination inadequate. The examples provided above, informed by the
analysis of the interactive, structural character of bias, demonstrate that
although there are general themes and patterns that help in understanding
and defining racial and gender dynamics, the particular meaning of racial
and gender interactions can only be understood in context. 110 This insight
helps understand and accept the courts' inability to develop a universal,
specific rule governing sexual harassment. Instead, the courts have
articulated a series of factors that are to be taken into account in a particular
context to determine whether behavior constitutes a hostile working
environment. 1 Although courts can and have identified factors such as
the seriousness of the conduct, the extent of contact, and the nature of the
power relationship in which the harassment arises, the interaction of those
factors in a particular context determines whether the conduct constitutes a
hostile environment in the case under consideration. 112 Similarly, the
particular expression of racial and gender diversity must be understood in
context to enable effective work teams to operate and to promote
constructive conflict that produces organizational learning. For example, if
the women in a particular work group that was previously all-male deal
with issues of conflict and collaboration differently than the previous norm,
that difference will likely generate disagreements that could either fragment
the work group or expand the group's repertoire of strategies. The
significance of the difference that correlates with gender or race will vary
with the configuration of the group and the nature of the task at hand and
thus must be addressed contextually.
Lawyers' traditional response to the absence of clear rules frequently
misses the discretionary group level of action that is so crucial in the
110. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 19.
111. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, No. 97-282, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4216, at *53-61 (1998);
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21-23 (1993).
112. See Harris,510 U.S. at 21-23.
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emerging workplace. One response is to define a safe zone of conduct that
could not be found under any circumstances to violate the legal norm and
to articulate a rule steering behavior toward that safety zone. For example,
lawyers may counsel organizations to avoid sexual harassment problems by
discouraging any informal or social contact among men and women,
particularly if they are in unequal positions of power in the organization.
This approach risks perpetuating the dynamics of exclusion by isolating
women from the informal networks through which social capital and access
to advancement develop. It may thus fail to avoid liability and will most
likely hamper the capacity of teams to address conflict constructively and
to work together effectively. Similarly, lawyers may counsel clients not to
share decision making responsibilities with work teams to avoid problems
with subjective decision making. At least in organizations committed to
this approach to production for economic reasons, this advice tends to
marginalize lawyers, to encourage clients to avoid their participation unless
and until a crisis arises, and to deal with any claims of racial or gender bias
on a purely individual level.
Another response is for law to encourage the construction of elaborate
due process regimes that respond to individual claims of discrimination
after the fact. This type of legal intervention serves important purposes
such as resolving individual conflicts and sanctioning individuals who have
engaged in demonstrably biased decision making. But it does not get at the
underlying source of the problem, and it fails to encourage or enable
organizations to operate proactively in an attempt to avoid these issues.
This analysis suggests that significant limitations exist in the current
structure of legal intervention. As organizations become more fluid and
power is exercised through group interaction and decision making, it
becomes necessary to experiment with structural approaches to legal
intervention that focus on systems of decision making and explicitly
employ organizational incentives and nonlegal actors in the project of
creating lawful, inclusionary practices within institutions. The challenge
becomes one of forging a dynamic relationship between the role of law in
enforcing minimum standards of conduct through sanctions, and the role of
law in creating incentives for organizations to develop internal regulatory
regimes that enable organizational actors to structure fair, accountable, and
effective systems for exercising discretion. These incentives could consist
of regulatory support in the form of resources, information, and networking
among organizations facing similar challenges. They could also emerge
out of regulatory approaches that tie the level of scrutiny of the outcomes
of discretionary decisions to the organization's demonstrated capacity to
engage in fair and accountable decision making.
Recent developments in case law, particularly in the area of sexual
harassment, explicitly invite this kind of experimentalism-both in the
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relationship between formal law and organizational law-and in creating
incentives for organizations to develop more structural, proactive
approaches to discrimination.
However, the dominant approach to
intervention frequently embodied in the case law and applied by lawyers
encourages organizations to create internal processes that simply replicate
the individual, after-the-fact, fault-based approaches that misdefine the
problem and the necessary response. Courts have articulated standards for
employer liability that focus on the adequacy of after-the-fact responses to
individual complaints of harassment. These decisions, which end up as
boilerplate in many sexual harassment policies, do not create legal
incentives for organizations to engage in a process of self-assessment that
would produce genuine accountability and organizational self-monitoring.
If such a process of genuine self-assessment were linked to overall issues
of decision making, it has the capacity to generate information regarding
system failures that could improve the level of fairness and productivity
more generally. Indeed, the search for methods of producing fair processes
of decision making around issues of racial and gender difference can
provide an ongoing catalyst for organizational learning that otherwise
would not exist.
This deliberative, structural approach is not new, at least to some.
Economic and technical demands have already induced some organizations
to move in this direction. Innovative managers, activists, and unions have
begun experimenting with these approaches to conflict resolution. The
next section speculates about how to develop a legal regulatory regime that
encourages organizations to develop this capacity and to pool their local
knowledge as a way of refining the general principles that guide local
practice. It offers one concrete example of an innovative approach to race,
gender, and law in the workplace that could be linked to and encouraged by
a more reflexive and dynamic form of legal regulation.
III. BRIDGING THE GAP: STRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO RACE, GENDER,
AND THE LAW

What might a more structural, dynamic approach to discrimination
regulation look like? At this stage, the response to this question is
somewhat abstract and tentative, and is offered in the spirit of
experimentation. I begin with an example involving the development of a
system for addressing sexual harassment at a university to provide a
concrete illustration of some of the principles of this structural approach to
law and lawyering. I will then extrapolate from this story to some of the
general themes that might comprise a more structural approach to
workplace regulation.
This example comes out of my experience as a consultant for
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universities concerning their processes for addressing sexual harassment.
At University X, the administration appointed a committee to respond to
concerns about the inadequacy of the existing processes for addressing
harassment. A lawyer was designated as the chair of a committee charged
with the responsibility of assessing the organization's implementation of its
sexual harassment policy. The committee's composition, self-defined
mission, and method reflected an emphasis on structural regulation that is
unusual for compliance reviews managed by legal actors. Typically, such
an inquiry might focus on assessing the adequacy of the University's
written policies and procedures in relation to established legal
requirements, and on proposing changes in the language of the formal
policies and procedures to respond to concerns about clarity, validity, and
comprehensiveness. Alternatively, it might focus on the adequacy of the
University's response to a particular incident. Instead, this committee
undertook to examine the extent to which the systems in place for
addressing problems of harassment had the capacity to affect the actual
decisions and practices within various sub-communities within the
University. The composition of the committee reflected the emphasis on
addressing the levels of activity that would be necessary to deal with
harassment problems as they occurred. The committee consisted of
stakeholders representing the various groups interested in, responsible for,
or affected by the problems of sexual harassment: faculty members,
undergraduate and graduate students, central administration, advocacy
organizations on campus representing the interests of women and people of
color, the general counsel's office, the non-faculty employees, and the
resource officers charged with the responsibility of dealing with harassment
complaints.
Sexual harassment law played an important role in framing the work
of the committee, but it did not narrowly determine the committee's focus
or method of defining and addressing the problem. The fact that sexual
harassment problems exposed the University to legal liability gave the
work of the committee legitimacy and urgency as well as a general
normative direction. The legal prohibition of harassment legitimated the
work of the committee and tied the work of the committee to a norm that
could not be ignored. It did not, however, adequately define the meaning
of harassment in practice at the University or the ways in which the
University could reflect that meaning in its day-to-day practice. The
committee undertook to identify how sexual harassment emerged in the
University setting, and how its own system of evaluating, rewarding, and
disciplining workplace behavior either discouraged or permitted such
conduct.
The committee first identified problem areas that reflected
breakdowns in the system of implementation, such as exploitive graduate

678

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 1:2

student/faculty advisor relationships, inadequate responses to abuses by
high status individuals, the failure to pool and act on information
suggesting patterns of abuse, and inadequate knowledge among
administrators, faculty, and students about the avenues for seeking an
effective and constructive resolution. The committee identified among its
own members overlapping areas of interest, activity, and information, and
the ways in which committee members might integrate their day-to-day
activities. Committee members surfaced and worked through longstanding misperceptions and feelings of distrust among those charged with
responsibility for addressing harassment, and identified the administrative
mechanisms that perpetuated those fractured relationships. Individuals
with information and experience involving the University's handling of
sexual harassment met with the committee to provide information and
answer questions. Individual names and cases were not mentioned, but
patterns within particular departments or among a certain type of
relationship were discussed. In this way, no information of a confidential
nature was revealed, but areas of common concern could be identified and
discussed. This inquiry revealed that the internal processes for addressing
harassment, such as informal mediation or formal hearing, did not connect
with or directly influence the avenues actually available within particular
communities for addressing harassment. In addition, concerns over turf
and accountability acted to discourage proactive efforts to address
harassment before it escalated into a crisis. Multiple entry points into the
dispute resolution process simply diffused responses, instead of expanding
opportunities for redress or addressing the problems at its source, as
originally intended. Committee members also used the inquiry into the
enforcement of sexual harassment policy as a way of identifying more
fundamental problems in the system of communication, decision making,
and dispute resolution.
After identifying the nature of the problems and the breakdown of
existing approaches, the committee undertook the task of identifying how
this inadequate system exacerbated the underlying problem of harassment,
and the need to address harassment at the level of interaction among
faculty, students, and administrators. The committee developed a plan for
information sharing at the aggregate level, and for periodic informal
exchanges of information about complaints and concerns. It proposed the
development of some mechanism of accountability for the overall process
of evaluation to assure that it takes into account concerns about abuses of
role. In-house counsel, advocacy groups, and organizations representing
the interests of various stakeholders were proposed as effective players in
assuring the accountability and legitimacy of the evaluation process. The
committee also proposed a role for in-house counsel and the affirmative
action office of assuring that issues of harassment are built into the yearly
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training and education of new chairs, administrators, and supervisors, as
well as students. It suggested building into the system of evaluation for
purposes of salary and tenure concerns about the professional exercise of
power over subordinates, including sexual harassment. It linked concerns
about abuses of power through sexual relationships to the more general
issue of professionalism. It also proposed that individuals and groups
within each school or department with the power and interest to address
issues of harassment be identified, that the power and responsibility to
develop effective responses be placed with these individuals, and that
support in the way of resources and training be provided by the University.
Many of those who participated were initially quite skeptical about the
process and the desire to produce any results. The typical approach to
addressing complaints in the past had been to create a committee to study
the problem that defused organized dissatisfaction. But participants
representing very different constituencies within the University-faculty,
staff, graduate students, resource offices-also expressed a thirst for a
space where they could brainstorm together, pool information, and develop
the capacity to address underlying patterns of dysfunction that produced
many of the complaints. The challenge was to create and sustain a process
that could translate this shared interest into an ongoing and dynamic space
for policy making, information sharing, and problem solving among
diverse constituencies within the community.
The problem orientation to the process permitted the committee to
translate and contextualize the meaning of harassment, to identify the
factors that contributed to the problem, to embed the analysis in the
incentive structure and dynamics of the organization as a whole, and to
develop responses that would address both the legal norm and the
underlying concerns of the various stakeholders. The process served to
support the legitimacy of separate communities of interest around issues of
harassment, as it also linked these communities in a common project. This
process helped translate the problem of harassment into terms that were
important to stakeholders who previously thought of the issue as irrelevant.
It also identified areas of overlapping concern among disconnected
stakeholders who previously lacked the opportunity of conceptual
framework permitting collaboration. In this sense, the process created the
possibility of redefining boundaries and relationships in ways that more
accurately reflected the complexity of concerns at the table.
The committee used its process to bring together representatives of
various constituencies within the organization and to build on informal
networks of information and accountability. It brought together people
who knew about the problems, the crises waiting to happen, and the
relationship of sexual harassment to broader issues of organizational
practice. The process generated information about how existing systems
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were failing. It also enabled the transfer of information across boundaries,
to people with the power to act. Institutionalizing this policy process
would provide a mechanism for continually generating information and
translating that information into the norm generating process.
This process also brought together people who knew about and were a
part of the existing networks of problem solving and dispute resolution,
which were not limited to the formal "legal" process set up to handle sexual
harassment complaints. It included the people who would have to
implement the policy on the ground and respond to problems as they arose.
Thus, the stakeholders who participated in the process of "law"
development had diverse but overlapping concerns. Patterns of exclusion
or harassment that affected not only women and people of color, but also
other groups within the University community, could be explored. This
permitted the identification of the particularities of sexual harassment and
its signifying character of broader problems or concerns.
This group focused its energy on generating creative and proactive
solutions, as well as on discovering ways of addressing crises. It also
identified flash points for conflict and likely areas of abuse. It identified
existing groups that could provide safe spaces for taking proactive steps. It
offered suggestions about how to build concerns about sexual harassment
into the process of structuring relationships between graduate students and
their faculty advisors. It explored ways of integrating training into the
process of learning how to manage better and smarter. Instead of looking
exclusively to legal rules and legalistic processes, the group linked the legal
problem of sexual harassment with the organizational problem of managing
unequal and amorphous relationships.
This process was a participatory endeavor that developed out of
involvement by representative groups with meaningful roles and
investment in the long-term implementation of the norms at issue. It
focused on the dynamics and power relationships within the workplace, not
simply on formal legal norms or potential bad actors. The process moved
away from an exclusively individualistic model of problem definition and
response and was potentially prospective and remedial in orientation. It
employed genuine pluralism and shared power as a mechanism of
accountability. It was not one-shot, but rather was built into the day-to-day
functioning of the organization.
The approach to lawyering reflected in this story also departs from the
individualistic and combative model. Law played a crucial role of
continuing to ground the aspirations of the committee in the practical
demands of complying with legal requirements.
The lawyers also
continually linked every-day practice with embedded values of fairness,
accountability, and participation. The problem-oriented approach made
law important but not adequate or defining of the particular outcomes
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implementing the legal aspiration. It broke down the dichotomy between
formal law and informal practice, and between public interest and private
representation. It required the lawyer who oversaw the process to act as a
facilitator of preventive and informal legal culture, using formal legal
norms and adversary process as the impetus and boundary setter. It
expanded the concept of law and lawyering to include professional norms
and administrative practice.
This committee did not substitute for the existing informal or formal
dispute resolution processes in operation. The committee's legitimacy and
power rested in no small part on the continuing specter of external legal
intervention to enforce the norm of harassment free workplaces and
Committee members also stressed the importance of
classrooms.
maintaining effective channels for informally resolving claims where
alleged targets of harassment desired prompt and confidential redress. The
committee's approach integrated the formal and informal levels of
regulation. It also added a structural dimension that took account of the
dynamic nature of harassment and the importance of addressing patterns
established at the group and intermediate level of the relevant communities
of interaction. What it does not do is link that internal, local knowledge to
the more general process of norm development. Many of the innovative,
structural interventions in the area of sexual harassment regulation continue
to be ad hoc, local, and private in the sense that they do not inform the
development of more general practice and knowledge.
The intervention described here was not directly prompted, supported,
or held accountable by the regulatory regime of judicial or administrative
enforcement. The completely internal character of this structural approach
to law leaves its success or failure entirely to the internal dynamics of
power and change within the organization. The absence of any external
involvement also limits the learning that other organizations experience as
a result of whatever success University X achieved in building an internal
legal regime that translates legal norms into organizational practices.
Indeed, under the current system, the process of internal self evaluation
would most likely be used against the University as evidence of the
inadequacy of the current sexual harassment policy.
It is quite possible to conceive of a regulatory regime that would
encourage University X to take seriously and follow through on efforts to
develop an accountable, fair, and functional approach to decision making
that embodies the values of nondiscrimination and inclusion. This might
take the form of an administrative agency that provides technical
assistance, resources, and information to universities and other employers
attempting to construct effective internal governance systems. It might also
bring employers engaged in similar efforts together to learn from each
other and to engage over time in redesigning their systems. Finally,
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effective and accountable internal regimes could be a basis for reducing the
level of scrutiny of individual decisions by a university, at least in instances
involving subjective, group-based processes of decision making. This
regulatory regime would not substitute for judicial oversight in cases of
harassment where employers chose not to develop effective internal
governance regimes that had meaningful potential for accountability and
institutional transformation. Its success would also depend on being able to
develop ways of evaluating the adequacy of employers' and universities'
internal governance systems. But even with these limitations, such a
regulatory regime could create the space and support for organizations to
begin to experiment and collaborate in developing governance structures
that link legal norms with the instrumental and organizational concerns.
From this illustration of an ad hoc effort to develop an internal "legal"
process that would engage the problem of harassment at the organizational
level, I extrapolate several more general elements of a structural approach
to discrimination regulation. First, within this regulatory regime, the
organization would be viewed as a site for explicit law making and
implementation. Law would explicitly strive to encourage organizational
actors to examine the structures, incentives, and norms of the
organizational context, and to develop internal structures and processes that
connect organizational practice to the articulation and implementation of
legal norms. This requires examining the deeper meaning of legal norms in
relation to the organizational culture at issue, and serving as an
intermediary between externally-defined legal principles and their internal
organizational translation. It also entails examining the pivotal decision
points that structure values and priorities, and connecting important legal
values to those "informal regulatory regimes."
For example, in the Johnson Wax example described in Section I, the
regulatory project would focus on the company's efforts at the level of the
shop floor to create work teams that have the capacity to employ fair,
effective, and accountable decision making processes. Members of the
work group, supervisors who evaluate the efforts of the group, and officials
who shape and act on the decisions of the group would be viewed as legal
actors for purposes of establishing and implementing the internal regulatory
regime. These actors would then be equipped with the tools to examine the
processes used to reach decisions about work and workers, who has the
capacity to influence those decisions, the standards that actually influence
decision making, and how the group takes account of difference and
conflict, both in relation to the production goals of the work group and in
relation to the norms of fairness, inclusion, and nondiscrimination.
Lawyers or human resource officials working with lawyers would help
both identify the relevant internal "legal" stakeholders, the applicable legal
norms, and the skills and processes necessary to link day-to-day practice
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with those legal norms. This could include introducing the idea of ongoing
training and self-assessment as part of the regular practice of team-based
decision making.
Second, this project entails reconceptualizing the meaning and the
framework used for taking race/gender into account. Instead of treating
racial and gender issues solely as special interest concerns of significance
to group members who are victimized by discriminatory practices, patterns
of racial and gender exclusion should also serve as signifiers that flag areas
of concern not only for the groups visibly affected, but also for a broader
group of individuals or concerns that otherwise remain invisible. The
experience of women and people of color frequently signifies patterns of
organizational dysfunction or unfairness that affect a much broader group.
They also offer a source of organizational reflection and evaluation that can
disrupt patterns of inertia. The proposed system of regulation would permit
and encourage an ongoing dynamic between patterns particular to treatment
of women and people of color and more general patterns of exercising
power. Redefining racial and gender bias in this way also encourages 113a
problem, rather than a case, orientation to racial and gender conflict.
What is the pattern of noncompliance or bias that underlies a complaint?
How does it relate to the capacity of the organization to function fairly and
effectively?
In the context of the Johnson Wax example, the experience of
African-Americans who challenged the fairness of the team-based decision
making process could be viewed as a signal of more systemic problems
with the system of decision making. Perhaps their experience suggests that
the teams are not adequately equipped to take into account and learn from
diverse members of the team, and that they cannot adequately address
conflict and difference in ways that keep group members engaged in the
overall effort. Many of the steps that might be taken to reduce racial or
gender bias might in fact improve the productivity and fairness of the
overall process, such as articulating clear standards and criteria, requiring
that decisions be shared and explained, comparing and attempting to
reconcile differences in assessment, assuring that decisions are based on
experience and knowledge rather than preconception, and providing skills
enabling conflict about relationships to be translated into conflict over
differences in approach to the work that can be connected to functional
difference.
Third, treatment of race and gender bias as a signifier has implications
for those who participate in the process of articulating and enforcing
internal regulatory norms. Participation and accountability by both internal
and external stakeholders of the organization play a crucial role in

113. See SPARRow, supra note 72, at 108.
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legitimating this organizational regime. People with incentives to promote
the success of the organization and to hold the organization accountable to
underlying legal norms would participate in decision making. Groups
organized to protect values reflected in legal standards would play a
significant role in designing solutions to problems of exclusion and
unfairness, and in holding organizations accountable for their adherence to
the system of decision making that is developed. For example, in the
Johnson Wax example, advocacy groups for women and people of color
could participate in the process of designing systems to minimize bias and
would address problems when they arise. At the same time, others affected
by the underlying problem signified by the racial or gender dispute would
also participate in the process. This group could include workers from
different disciplines who face communication problems as a result,
representatives from other parts of the production process with concerns
that are not adequately reflected in the day-to-day decisions of the team, or
others with interests or information that should influence the team's
decision making process.
Fourth, the external legal community-courts, administrative
agencies, legislatures, and local government entities-would create
incentives for the organization to construct systems of self-conscious
experimentation that link concerns about race and gender fairness to overall
decision making processes. The legal community would then share this
information publicly to help develop legal norms. These incentives could
take the form of resources (technical or monetary) which could be used by
the organization to develop effective systems. Incentives could also be
created through standards of review. The more participatory, accountable,
responsive, and effective the organization's internal regulatory regime, the
less stringent the external review.114 Organizations that develop the
capacity to make accountable, lawful, nonexclusionary decisions would be
rewarded through reduced regulatory oversight and resource support. This
approach would require organizational actors to develop ways of evaluating
the success of their system in terms that could be monitored and
communicated both within the organization and to external legal
agencies.1 5 Ideally, the internal system of benchmarking would produce a
record of systematic, structural decision making that could be used to show
regulators that the process is working. In addition, public agencies could
provide resources and expertise, and pool information from various

114. One form of incentive is reflected in recent work such as Ian Ayres and John
Braithwaite's theory in Responsive Regulation. The authors believe in creating a pyramid of
regulation that reduces government oversight if organizations demonstrate that they have
undertaken responsibility for self governance. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAiTE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE

115. See Doff & Sabel, supra note 6.

(1992).

1998]

RACE, GENDER, AND THE LAW

workplaces to assist organizations in the development of effective systems
for decision making that reduce bias and enable conflict around issues of
difference to be addressed openly and constructively. 116 This role could
either be assumed by existing regulatory agencies, such as the EEOC, or
undertaken by new agencies.
Fifth, this regulatory approach does not aim to articulate a universal
blueprint or model to be imposed from the top down across all
organizations and contexts. This approach is only possible in particular
institutional contexts which exhibit the capacity and incentive to engage in
a collaborative regulatory regime. As Charles Sabel has noted in other
regulatory contexts, the general principle that cuts across all workplaces is
that the problems of how to address issues of race, gender, age, etc. are
complexly local.' 17 Every organization will face such problems as how to
address multiracial group dynamics, relational conflict, racial and gender
stereotyping, and bias as a feature of discretionary decision making. The
pattern and dynamic of those problems will be a function of the particular
environment, and the appropriate response cannot be determined as a
universal rule applicable to all contexts. Instead, it must emerge out of the
dynamics, incentive structures, and mechanisms of accountability particular
to each workplace. The process of learning about and setting up structures
to respond to these issues in a particular site will then generate knowledge
of what works and what does not work. This knowledge can be shared
with other workplaces and can be fed back to the general effort to identify
patterns and overarching general principles to help guide the local search
for problem definition and solution.
This project seeks to encourage a series of structured, ongoing,
participatory, and locally grounded experiments, and to create a structure
that encourages interaction between general legal norms and particular
systems for translating those norms into organizational practice.11 8 Law
emerges as a web of interconnected norms, incentives, rules, and practices
that take shape in interaction between local experiments and renegotiation
of underlying, widely shared norms. 19 The feedback between the
organizational experiments and the generalized norm is a crucial defining
element of the law. The project of structuring organizational practice and
decision making is a critical element of law making as well. Therefore,
formal, externally-enforced legal regulation would continue to exist as the

116. This regulatory role resembles the approach of manufacturing technology centers,

which is described by Charles Sabel in A MEASURE OF FEDERALISM: ASSESSING
MANUFACTURING CENTERS 9 (Feb. 22, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
117. See Sabel, supranote 82, at 23.
118. This work builds on the preliminary analysis set out by Susan Sturm and Lani
Guinier. See Sturm & Guinier, supranote 19.
119. See Sabel, supra note 82.
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backdrop for this structural regulatory regime.
Finally, this project of reconceiving law in organizational terms also
suggests the need to develop a more democratic and inclusive vision of law
and lawyering. 2 0° Lucie White has articulated a vision of lawyers as
"architects of social and civic space."12' The project of rethinking lawyers'
roles in context is an important step in a much larger project of
reconceiving the role of the law-a central task for critical theorists and
progressives. As a way of entering this conversation about reconceiving
lawyers' roles, I have employed the label "problem-solver" as the
placeholder for the role of the lawyer in the organizational context.12 Law
and legal roles emerge out of the demands and possibilities of the setting
and problem at hand. Instead of reasoning back from the formal legal
process and rule to determine the limitations on the scope of permissible
action, the lawyer as problem-solver begins with the context, problem, and
organizational setting. The problem-solver defines law and legal process
more broadly, dynamically, and proactively. The law functions as both an
aspiration and a constraint. The challenge is to build compliance with legal
norms into the incentive structure and framework of operation, and in the
process, to use the law and legal process to enhance the fairness and
productivity of the organization.
This approach to lawyering moves beyond a formalistic approach to
law in the organizational context. Law becomes more than a set of
externally-imposed rules to be followed or evaded. It also consists of a set
of practices and principles that emerge both outside of, and in interaction
with, formal and instrumental law.12 3 The lawyer as a problem-solver links
these organizational norms and practices with the external norms that
formal law seeks to impose. She can introduce certain basic principles of
legitimacy that underlie the aspiration of American legal norms to the
decision making processes within the organization. These include fairness,

120. This section builds on an earlier article. See Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiatorsto
Problem Solvers: Connecting Conversations About Women, the Academy, and the Legal
Profession,4 DuKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 119 (1997).
121. In email correspondence with the author, White argues that lawyers are well-trained
and positioned to help community groups create the social and public spaces that they need
to nurture their own individual and collective citizenship. Whether you call these sites
homeplaces, free spaces, spaces of resistance, or intermediate institutions of civil society,
they are local spaces within which citizens can come together to act together as citizens.
122. This word does not fully capture the nature of the role I put forth. It fails to capture
the ideas of integrating and translating different disciplines, making law real on the ground,
linking the aspirational and the practical, and bringing to the table a sense of the relationship
of legal requirements to organizational practices and goals. I continue to search for a more
appropriate label as part of the project of developing this conception of law and lawyering.
123. See Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal
Scholarshipand Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1993); Edelman, supra note 28;
Susan S. Silbey, Ideals and Practicesin the Study of Law, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 7, 20 (1985).
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participation, and reasoned and principled conduct. Each of these concepts
can be translated into organizational terms.
For example, in the Johnson Wax scenario, the lawyers as problemsolvers might participate in a team of actors with different forms of
expertise, faced with the challenge of redesigning the way teams function.
The lawyer would be situated to help the group link the issue of racial and
gender bias to the broader question of how teams decide on work
assignments, resolve conflict, and evaluate performance. He or she could
help assemble the actors with the necessary expertise and power to equip
teams to act fairly and effectively, and work with others to design a system
that builds in continual self-monitoring to the production process. The
lawyer could also pose questions that conceptually link basic legal
principles of fairness and legitimacy with the requirements of day-to-day
employment decision making. Such questions include whether there are
stated criteria that govern the assessments of decision makers and team
members, whether such criteria adequately reflect the goals and range of
options available, whether the decision making process require the actors to
articulate the basis for their decisions, whether the risks of bias in the
decision making process been identified and minimized, whether the
decision making group reflects or takes account of diverse approaches,
backgrounds, and experiences, and whether there is a way of signaling
relational conflict, particularly as it implicates demographic differences
such as race and gender and translating that conflict into disagreements that
either benefit the work of the group or do not significantly impact work
related decisions connected to the work of the group or minimized in its
impact on work related decisions.
Lawyers as problem-solvers face the challenge of reconciling norms
of autonomy and integrity with the demands of operating as counselors,
collaborators, facilitators of decision making processes, and participants in
managerial decision making. Crisis management skills continue to be part
of the repertoire of legal roles. Organizations' willingness to involve
lawyers in shaping day-to-day practice rests at least in part on lawyers'
expertise in the formal, adversarial world. Yet lawyers' effectiveness
depends on their capacity to reconcile the "gladiator" role with the
informal, integrative, dynamic role of lawyer as problem-solver. 124
IV. CONCLUSION

This article has proceeded from the premise that internal systems of
124. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem-Solving,31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984); Stephen Nathanson, The Role
of Problem Solving in Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167 (1989); Sturm, supra note
120.
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regulation are themselves an important part of the legal landscape, and that
they should be analyzed explicitly as such. It begins to explore the
relationship between systems of workplace decision making and legal
analysis of those systems and to question the continued validity of some of
the assumptions about organizational structure and bias reflected in legal
doctrine. The dominant approach to regulation of discrimination in the
workplace fails to mediate between the formal and informal, the
organizational and the legal, the individual and the group, the instrumental
and the prescriptive, and the external and the internal. This article argues
that changes in the structure of workplace governance and in the dynamics
of racial and gender bias make the failure to take account of organizations'
day-to-day internal regulatory regime as "law" particularly problematic.
Solutions to problems of discrimination in the workplace and current legal
diagnosis of these problems frequently focus on the wrong level of activity
within the organization and misdefine the nature of the problematic
conduct. 125 Legal intervention often fails to alter the dynamics that cause
exclusion and can have perverse or counter-productive effects on racial and
gender dynamics in particular and organizational governance in general.
As a result, the categories that frame legal regulation are inadequate, both
descriptively and normatively.
At the organizational level, a more structural and embedded approach
to legal norms already surfaced in some workplaces. Creative lawyers,
managers, worker organizations, and human resource professionals have
begun to experiment with problem solving and accountability systems that
pay attention to the processes of group interaction and to the task of
mediating between organizational practice and legal norms. Particularly in
the area of sexual harassment, some organizations have developed multitiered approaches to preventing and redressing sexual harassment through
reshaping patterns of decision making within organizations. 126 These
systems explicitly focus on establishing diverse, accountable decision
making structures for groups, involving groups in the process of problem
definition and resolution around issues of race and gender, equipping
managers and workers to translate legal norms into organizational practice,
and holding group decision makers accountable for the results of those
processes. However, these innovations in practice often operate outside or
even at odds with the approaches developed by lawyers to address

125. For a structural analysis of the organizational and cultural dynamics that underlie
sex segregation in the workplace, see Vicki Schultz, supra note 18, at 1815-39.
126. See, e.g., Mary P. Rowe, The Upward Feedback, Mediation Process at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DispuTEs WiTHouT

ITIGATION 190 (Alan F. Westin & Aired G. Feliu eds., 1988). For a description of one
effort to develop a more structural, dynamic approach to discrimination, see Section IV of
this article.
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discrimination. They have not yet influenced the approach to legal
regulation of discrimination more generally.
This article will hopefully encourage others to experiment with
creative forms of legal regulation in workplace settings. The expansion of
the concept of legal regulation of discrimination is a central challenge for
those concerned about race, gender, and the law in the twenty-first century
workplace.

